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PREVENTIVE DETENTION DISTORTED:  
WHY IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL  
TO DETAIN IMMIGRANTS WITHOUT 
PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS 
Whitney Chelgren* 
There are two main problems with the current immigration detention 
system: the conditions of confinement and the procedural mechanisms 
that are used to detain noncitizens. The current conditions of 
confinement cast serious doubt on the constitutionality of the detention 
system. Although it is purportedly civil, immigration detention is very 
much a punitive institution. Moreover, there is no binding regulation 
governing the operation of detention facilities or the conduct of 
detention staff. The problems that stem from this lack of regulatory 
oversight are compounded by the fact that many detention centers are 
run as for-profit businesses. More fundamentally, noncitizens are 
detained without the procedural protections that inhere in all other 
preventive detention contexts. Because there is no principled 
justification for this aberration, the constitutionality of the detention 
system is, at best, highly suspect. At a minimum, immigrants should 
receive pre-detention hearings to determine whether their detention is 
in the government’s interest, and there should be time constraints 
imposed on pre-removal order detention. 
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[D]ue process requires that the nature and duration of 
commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose 
for which the individual is committed.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1984, Mr. Vinodbhai Bholidas Patel left India and started a 
life in the United States.2 He lived and worked in St. Louis, Missouri, 
where he opened several businesses, including doughnut-shop 
franchises, bagel shops, and hotels.3 In 1990, Mr. Patel became a 
lawful permanent resident,4 and in 1996, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) approved his application for 
naturalization.5 Mr. Patel quickly became a well-respected member 
of his community.6 All of Mr. Patel’s immediate family—his wife, 
his four children, and his brother—legally resided in the United 
States as well.7 
Despite the fact that the INS approved Mr. Patel’s application 
for naturalization, the immigration authorities failed to schedule his 
oath of allegiance.8 Mr. Patel, frustrated with the holdup, filed an 
action challenging the delay, and in 2000, a district court ordered the 
immigration authority to administer the oath.9 Instead, the 
immigration authority revoked its approval of Mr. Patel’s request for 
naturalization, initiated proceedings to have him removed from the 
country, and placed him in immigration detention.10 
The year prior, Mr. Patel had been charged with harboring an 
undocumented alien, an offense that Mr. Patel pleaded guilty to after 
admitting to employing and housing the undocumented immigrant.11 
The conviction constituted an “aggravated felony” that authorized 
 
 1. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). 
 2. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 4, Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2001) (No. 01-
2398), abrogated by Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 4 n.1. 
 6. Id. at 4. 
 7. Id. at 4–5, 5 n.2. 
 8. Id. at 4 n.1. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 4 n.1, 5–6. 
 11. Id. 
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immigration authorities to mandatorily detain Mr. Patel, without a 
bond hearing, during the entire removal process.12 Although 
Mr. Patel, a long-standing, law-abiding, legal permanent resident, 
was sentenced to only five months in prison for his offense, he was 
confined in detention for almost a year.13 
Mr. Patel’s story highlights some of the inequities that mar the 
United States’ immigration detention system. Currently, immigration 
authorities can detain noncitizens without individualized hearings.14 
Without such hearings, however, the government cannot determine 
which noncitizens should be detained during the removal process and 
which noncitizens could be monitored through less invasive and 
expensive means. Moreover, as there are no time limits on pre-
removal detention, confinement can drag on,15 as illustrated by 
Mr. Patel’s case where the length of his detention was six months 
longer than the time he served for the underlying offense.16 The 
current immigration detention system is highly punitive in character, 
and yet it fails to provide individuals like Mr. Patel with even the 
basic procedural protections that exist in all other forms of civil 
detention. 
Part II of this Article will provide a background of immigration 
detention. Because immigration detention is essentially preventive 
detention, Part II will also explain the basic contours of preventive 
detention and the procedural safeguards that generally inhere in 
preventive detention schemes. 
Part III argues that the current conditions of confinement are 
constitutionally problematic for two reasons. First, although it is 
purportedly civil, the system has taken on a quasi-punitive character. 
Second, the system is unregulated. Part IV hones in on pre-removal 
order detention—the period of time before the court determines that 
a noncitizen is deportable and issues its removal order. Part IV 
demonstrates why the absence of two safeguards—individualized 
hearings and time limits—is constitutionally suspect. Part V 
 
 12. Id. at 5–6; see 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (2006). 
 13. Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299, 309 (3d. Cir. 2001), abrogated by Demore v. Kim, 538 
U.S. 510 (2003). 
 14. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 530–31. 
 15. See id. at 567–68 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 16. Patel, 275 F.3d at 309, abrogated by Demore, 538 U.S. at 510. 
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entertains and ultimately rejects the common justifications for the 
absence of these protections in the context of immigration detention. 
Part VI recommends an overhaul of the immigration detention 
system based on the limitations and protections that are present in 
other forms of civil detention. Part VI asserts that immigrants facing 
detention should receive individualized hearings to determine 
whether they pose threats to the public or risks of flight. Part VI also 
argues that there should be time limits on detention. Part VI then 
recommends that the government should reform the conditions of 
confinement to reflect the civil, regulatory purpose of immigrant 
detention and enforce those reforms through binding regulations. 
Finally, Part VI recommends that the government embrace 
alternative models of detention. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
To comprehend the problems of our current immigration 
detention system, one must understand not only the procedures, 
statutes, and infrastructure involved but also the underlying policies 
and rationale. Immigration detention is theoretically preventive 
detention. However, the system is often at odds with its purported 
goals. 
A.  Background to Immigration Detention 
Each year the United States detains more than 300,000 
immigrants, and the figure is steadily climbing.17 The government 
must spend $1.7 billion a year to accommodate the volume of 
immigrants passing through the system, and, as the numbers rise, the 
financial ramifications worsen.18 The system’s rapid expansion is 
largely attributable to two pieces of legislation passed in 1996—the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)19 and the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
 
 17. THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORMING OUR 
IMMIGRATION DETENTION SYSTEM AND PROMOTING ACCESS TO COUNSEL IN IMMIGRATION 
PROCEEDINGS 1 (2009) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION PROJECT], available at http://www. 
constitutionproject.org/pdf/359.pdf. 
 18. Tom Barry, Mass Incarceration of Immigrants, BORDER LINES (May 24, 2009, 
11:48 AM), http://borderlinesblog.blogspot.com/2009/05/mass-incarceration-of-immigrants.html. 
 19. Pub. L. No. 104-32, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
8 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 22 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.). 
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(IIRIRA).20 These provisions concurrently expanded the categories of 
immigrants that are subject to mandatory detention.21 Just two years 
after Congress passed AEDPA and IIRIRA, the number of 
immigrants in detention nearly doubled, increasing from 8,500 in 
1996 to nearly 16,000 in 1998.22 
The system’s growth can also be traced to immigration 
enforcement agencies’ increased reliance on home and workplace 
raids23 as well as to the government’s overall stricter enforcement of 
immigration laws in the wake of the September 11th terrorist 
attacks.24 Because of these changes in policy and legislation, each 
year the detention system struggles to hold a greater number of 
immigrants; there is no end in sight to the mass influx.25 In 2008, the 
United States detained a record-setting 378,582 immigrants,26 
surpassing the 2004 figure of 231,500 by more than 80,000.27 
1.  Statutory Framework 
The United States detains a diverse range of immigrants 
pursuant to several statutory provisions.28 Section 236(a) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) gives the Department of 
 
 20. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
8 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). 
 21. See DONALD KERWIN & SERIN YI-YING LIN, MIGRATION POLICY INST., IMMIGRATION 
DETENTION: CAN ICE MEET ITS IMPERATIVES AND CASE MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES? 6 
(2009), available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/detentionreportSept1009.pdf; Analysis 
of Immigration Detention Policies, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Aug. 18, 1999), http://www. 
aclu.org/immigrants-rights/analysis-immigration-detention-policies; see also Nina Rabin, 
Immigration Detention in Arizona: A Quietly Growing System Crying out for Reform, 45 ARIZ. 
ATT’Y, July–Aug. 2009, at 31, 31 (2009) (“The skyrocketing rate of growth of detention over the 
past decade is a direct result of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act . . . .”). 
 22. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, supra note 21. 
 23. KAREN TUMLIN ET AL., NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., A BROKEN SYSTEM vi, 1 
(2009), available at http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/arrestdet/A-Broken-System-2009-07.pdf. 
 24. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 13–14. 
 25. Michelle Brané & Christiana Lundholm, Human Rights Behind Bars: Advancing the 
Rights of Immigration Detainees in the United States Through Human Rights Frameworks, 22 
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 147, 147 (2008) (“[T]he rise in numbers is poised to continue well into the 
future.”). 
 26. KERWIN & LIN, supra note 21, at 7; DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT: IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (2009), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice-
detention-rpt.pdf. 
 27. Barry, supra note 18. 
 28. CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 108.02 (2010). 
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Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
discretion to detain immigrants during removal proceedings.29 If 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), a division of DHS, 
takes an immigrant into custody, ICE may, during the pendency of 
removal hearings, continue to detain or release the immigrant on a 
bond.30 
Next, under INA section 235(b)(1), the Secretary of Homeland 
Security must detain arriving aliens who are subject to expedited 
removal.31 Expedited removal is a summary process for expelling 
noncitizens who have not officially entered the United States and 
who do not possess proper documentation.32 Under current law, this 
category includes persons seeking political asylum.33 Before the 
enactment of IIRIRA, asylum-seekers were automatically released on 
parole while their applications were adjudicated.34 Now, their 
detention is mandatory until ICE determines whether they 
demonstrate a credible fear of persecution.35 If they cannot establish 
that fear, they will be detained until they are removed.36 
Pursuant to INA section 235(b)(2)(A),37 arriving aliens who are 
inadmissible38 but not subject to expedited removal—meaning that 
they are inadmissible for reasons other than improper documentation 
 
 29. Id. § 108.02(1). 
 30. Id. (stating that bond must be at least $1,500). To obtain release, the immigrant must 
demonstrate that he or she will not abscond or endanger his or her community. Id. § 108.05(2)(a). 
Should the immigrant be released on bond, ICE may rearrest and detain the immigrant at any 
time. Id. § 108.02(1). 
 31. Id. § 108.02(2)(a). 
 32. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 3. 
 33. Id. Asylum-seekers are immigrants who hope to gain refugee status in the United States 
based on a fear of prosecution in their home country. Id. The United States detains approximately 
1,400 noncriminal asylum-seekers each day. SCHRIRO, supra note 26, at 11. 
 34. GORDON, supra note 28, § 108.02(2)(a). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (2006). 
 38. An alien can be found “inadmissible” if the alien has been convicted of or admits to 
having committed particular crimes, if the alien is determined to have certain communicable 
diseases or disorders, if the alien is suspected to be involved in espionage or terrorist activities, if 
the alien is present without being admitted or paroled, if the alien does not possess proper 
documentation, if the alien has been previously removed, if the alien is a practicing polygamist, 
or if the alien has committed fraud or misrepresentation in an attempt to procure documentation. 
Id. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)–(10) (2006). 
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or misrepresentation—are, nevertheless, subject to mandatory 
detention.39 
Additionally, under INA section 236(c),40 immigrants who are 
convicted of certain criminal offenses must be detained.41 This 
category of “criminal aliens” breaks down into three subgroups, 
depending in part on whether the immigrant has legally entered the 
country.42 First, an immigrant who has not yet entered the country 
will be subject to mandatory detention if he or she has multiple prior 
criminal convictions43 or has been convicted of any one of a number 
of specified crimes.44 Next, an immigrant who has entered the 
country is deportable and subject to mandatory detention if he or she 
commits any one of a number of specified crimes within a designated 
number of years from the time that he or she was admitted to the 
country.45 Finally, an immigrant is either inadmissible and subject to 
mandatory detention or deportable and subject to mandatory 
detention for engaging in terrorist activity.46 Criminal aliens are only 
paroled when their release is necessary to further a government 
investigation.47 Otherwise, they can only challenge their detention on 
 
 39. Id. § 1225. The alien is detained for a proceeding under Id. § 240. Id. § 1229. 
 40. Id. § 1226. 
 41. Id. 
 42. For the difference between legal entrance and non-entrance, see Deborah M. Levy, 
Detention in the Asylum Context, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 297, 298 (1983) (“Under the fiction by 
which ‘admitted’ and ‘unadmitted’ aliens are distinguished, aliens taken into custody upon 
arrival, and aliens who present themselves to the authorities without evading inspection, have not 
made an ‘entry’ and are not ‘within’ the United States . . . .” (citing Shaughnessy v. United States 
ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953))). 
 43. In order to fall within this category of inadmissible persons who are subject to 
mandatory detention, the criminal convictions must add up to at least a five-year aggregate 
sentence. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2). 
 44. Id.; GORDON, supra note 28, § 108.02(2)(b) (an arriving alien is inadmissible if he or she 
has been convicted of one of the following: a crime of moral turpitude, controlled substance 
violations, drug trafficking, prostitution and commercialized vice, or involvement in human 
trafficking). 
 45. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)–(iii), (B), (C), (D); GORDON, supra note 28, § 108.02(2)(b) 
(a noncitizen is deportable and subject to mandatory detention if the noncitizen committed a 
crime of moral turpitude within five years of admission or within ten years for lawful permanent 
residents, provided: at least a one-year sentence was imposed; the noncitizen received multiple 
moral-turpitude convictions after entering the United States; the noncitizen received an 
aggravated-felony conviction after admission into the United States; the noncitizen received a 
controlled-substance conviction after admission into the United States; the noncitizen was 
charged with certain firearm offenses after admission into the United States; or the noncitizen 
committed a crime of sabotage, espionage, sedition, or treason). 
 46. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(3)(B), 1227(a)(4)(B); GORDON, supra note 28, § 108.02(2)(b). 
 47. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 5. 
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grounds that the governing statute does not apply to their case.48 In 
order to prevail on such a theory, the immigrant must carry a heavy 
burden and show that the government is “‘substantially unlikely’ to 
prove that an underlying conviction makes the non-citizen subject to 
mandatory detention.”49 
Finally, pursuant to INA section 241(a), the government must 
detain all immigrants who have received a final order of removal for 
a ninety-day “removal period.”50 If the government fails to remove 
the immigrant or the immigrant does not leave within that time 
frame, then the immigrant may be released, subject to an order of 
supervision, only if the immigrant can establish that he or she does 
not pose a danger to the community or a significant risk of flight.51 
2.  Facilities and Conditions of Detention 
The immigration detention system consists of three main types 
of facilities: Service Processing Centers (SPCs), Contract Detention 
Facilities (CDFs), and Intergovernmental Service Agreement 
facilities (IGSAs).52 Each of these types of facilities are owned or 
operated, to varying degrees, by private companies.53 For instance, 
ICE frequently enters into contractual arrangements with private 
companies that in turn staff SPC facilities with guards and other 
personnel.54 Similarly, CDFs are owned and operated by private, for-
profit contractors.55 ICE places the largest number of detainees in 
local prisons and jails—oftentimes alongside or even commingled 
with the criminal population56—pursuant to intergovernmental 
 
 48. See GORDON, supra note 28, § 108.05(3)(a)(i) (“Detained noncitizens may challenge 
their inclusion under the mandatory-detention provisions of the INA. . . . [A] noncitizen held 
pursuant to INA § 236(c) may seek a Joseph hearing in front of an [immigration judge] to 
determine whether the individual is ‘properly included’ within the mandatory-detention 
categories.”). 
 49. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 6. 
 50. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a); GORDON, supra note 28, § 108.02(2)(c). 
 51. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3); GORDON, supra note 28, § 108.02(2)(c). 
 52. TUMLIN, supra note 23, at 4. 
 53. Id. 
 54. ICE currently operates seven SPCs that hold about 13 percent of ICE immigrant 
detainees. Id. 
 55. Id. CDFs hold about 17 percent of immigrant detainees. Id. 
 56. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 15. 
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service agreements.57 Many IGSA facilities are operated by private, 
for-profit prison companies.58 
Immigrants in detention are held in strict, jail-like facilities 
under jail-like conditions.59 They are often “transported in shackles, 
subjected to strip searches, [and] confined to ‘lock down’ for 
hours.”60 They are housed in secure facilities with hardened 
perimeters and held under management plans that are largely based 
on command and control.61 In fact, ICE’s detention standards are 
“based upon corrections law” and are thereby designed to control the 
operation of jails and prisons rather than of civil detention facilities.62 
In addition, detention facilities are frequently located in remote areas 
of the country where detainees cannot easily access legal resources 
and are often isolated from their families and loved ones.63 DHS is at 
liberty to transfer detainees between the facilities scattered across the 
United States.64 
Immigration detention facilities do not follow any form of 
binding regulation.65 With the exception of IGSAs—ironically where 
the majority of immigrants are held66—immigration detention 
facilities are governed by nationwide detention standards, although 
these standards do not have the force of law and do not carry the 
same weight that codified regulation does.67 
In January 2010, in the wake of myriad reports of detainee 
deaths68 as well as egregious incidents of detention staff 
misconduct,69 DHS replaced the National Detention Standards with 
 
 57. TUMLIN, supra note 23, at 4. Currently, there are more than 350 IGSA facilities holding 
approximately 67 percent of detainees. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. SCHRIRO, supra note 26, at 4. 
 60. Rabin, supra note 21, at 32. 
 61. SCHRIRO, supra note 26, at 4. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. GORDON, supra note 28, § 108.04(1)(a). 
 65. See TUMLIN, supra note 23, at vi. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. (“[N]oncompliance carries no real penalty.”). 
 68. See Darryl Fears, 3 Jailed Immigrants Die in a Month, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2007, at 
A02. 
 69. See Bryan Lonegan, American Diaspora: The Deportation of Lawful Residents from the 
United States and the Destruction of Their Families, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 55, 67–
68 n.71 (noting that immigration staff has reportedly used threats of violence and deportation to 
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the Performance Based National Detention Standards (PBNDS).70 
Like the old standards, the PBNDS delineate the acceptable living 
conditions for detainees, including access to legal materials, food 
service, recreation, telephone access, and medical care.71 Although 
the new standards purportedly improve on the former standards by 
setting forth desired outcomes,72 the two are strikingly similar and 
will still not apply to IGSAs, where most detainees are held.73 
Furthermore, despite the efforts of immigration reform advocates, 
DHS declines to give the new regulations the force of law.74 
3.  Length of Detention 
Removal proceedings are not formally limited by time 
constraints,75 and detention can last for months or even years.76 
Although records regarding the numbers of immigrants passing 
through the detention system are not entirely accurate,77 a study 
conducted by the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) provides some 
 
coerce detainees into performing sex acts); see also Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration 
Detention, 110 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 42, 47 (2010), available at http://www. 
columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/110/42_Anil_Kalhan.pdf (noting that more than 
one hundred detainees have died in custody since 2003, and pointing to inadequate health care 
and neglect as contributing factors). 
 70. GORDON, supra note 28, § 108.04(1)(b). 
 71. Id. § 108.04(1)(b)–(c). 
 72. Id. § 108.04(1)(b). 
 73. TUMLIN, supra note 23, at 2–3. 
 74. DHS Refuses Rulemaking on Detention Standards, NAT’L IMMIGRATION FORUM 
(Aug. 13, 2009), http://www.immigrationforum.org/policy/agencies-display/dhs-refuses-
rulemaking-on-detention-standards/ (“Advocates had sought rulemaking by the agency in 2007, 
and DHS neglected to respond at all until June 2009, when it received a court order to do so with 
a 30 day deadline. Twenty-nine days later, DHS denied the advocates’ petition, asserting that the 
guidelines in place were sufficient.”). 
 75. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 567 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 76. See Welch v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 213, 227 (4th Cir. 2002) (lawful permanent resident 
mandatorily detained fourteen months before district court ordered bond hearing); see also 
Abimbola v. Ashcroft, No. 01CV5568(NG), 2002 WL 2003186, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2002) 
(noncitizen mandatorily detained twenty months before BIA order). 
 77. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., No. OIG-07-08, 
REVIEW OF U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT’S DETAINEE TRACKING PROCESS 
1 (2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_07-08_Nov06.pdf (“The 
detainee tracking system, for five of the eight ICE detention facilities tested, did not always 
contain timely information. . . . At six of eight ICE detention facilities tested, [the Deportable 
Alien Control System] and detention facility records did not always agree on the location of 
detainees, or contained information showing the detainee had been deported.”); see also 
AMNESTY INT’L, JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE: IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE USA 18 (2009), 
available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/pdfs/JailedWithoutJustice.pdf (noting that the precise 
number of immigrants detained each year “is not known as the DHS does not publish this data”). 
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insight into the statistics, on average, of time spent in detention.78 
MPI found that the average (mean) length of detention for detainees 
who were still awaiting a removal determination (“pre-removal order 
detainees”) was eighty-one days.79 With respect to those who had 
received a final removal order (“post-removal order detainees”), the 
average length of detention subsequent to receiving the removal 
order was seventy-two days up to that date.80 For post-removal order 
detainees, the average amount of total time spent in detention up to 
that date, counting from the first day in detention until the day that 
MPI collected its data, was 114 days.81 According to the study, 1,792 
persons had already been detained for over six months.82 
Most of the detainees who were counted in the study were not 
released the same day that the study was taken and remained in 
detention for days afterwards.83 Thus, in order to get a true picture of 
detention duration, the averages would have to be increased to reflect 
how long the detainees remained in confinement after the study 
concluded. 
B.  Background to Preventive Detention 
There are two main purposes behind immigration detention: to 
ensure that the government can successfully remove noncitizens by 
preventing immigrants from absconding before their removal 
hearings or after a final order of deportation, and to prevent 
deportable immigrants from committing crimes and endangering the 
public during the removal process.84 Immigration detention, 
therefore, is essentially preventive detention—it is not meant to exact 
a punitive sentence but is an administrative measure designed to help 
 
 78. KERWIN & LIN, supra note 21, at 6. The MPI study was based on information obtained 
pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, which required ICE to release data pertaining to the 
32,000 detainees currently in its custody on January 25, 2009. MPI used this snapshot data to 
produce its findings. Id. at 4–5. 
 79. Id. at 16. Twenty-six percent (4,848 persons) had already been detained for ninety days 
or longer, and 3 percent (570 persons) had been detained for one year or longer. Id. 
 80. Id. at 17. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 83. Id. at 19 n.40. 
 84. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513 (2003) (“We hold that Congress, justifiably 
concerned that deportable criminal aliens who are not detained continue to engage in crime and 
fail to appear for their removal hearings in large numbers, may require that persons such as 
respondent be detained for the brief period necessary for their removal proceedings.”). 
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the government keep track of immigrants who might ultimately be 
ordered removed and to prevent removable immigrants from 
committing crimes in the interim.85 
In 1987, the Supreme Court considered the constitutional limits 
of preventive detention in United States v. Salerno.86 The Court held 
that preventive detention under the Bail Reform Act did not violate 
the Due Process Clause because the Act served a legitimate 
regulatory purpose and Congress carefully limited the circumstances 
in which pretrial detention could be sought.87 The Bail Reform Act 
authorized pretrial detention of persons charged with particular 
felonies on the ground of future dangerousness, but only after the 
government demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence in an 
adversarial hearing that no conditions of release could reasonably 
assure that the arrestee would not pose a danger to the public.88 The 
judicial officer was required to consider factors such as “the nature 
and seriousness of the charges, the substantiality of the 
Government’s evidence against the arrestee, the arrestee’s 
background and characteristics, and the nature and seriousness of the 
danger posed by the suspect’s release.”89 The Bail Reform Act 
entitled the arrestee to numerous procedural protections during the 
detention hearing, including the right to request counsel, to testify, to 
present witnesses, to proffer evidence, and to cross-examine other 
witnesses.90 The Bail Reform Act also mandated that detainees be 
housed separately from convicts, and another piece of legislation, the 
Speedy Trial Act, strictly limited the maximum length of detention.91 
 
 85. In fact, immigration detention is necessarily preventive detention because DHS is not 
authorized to detain persons for punitive purposes since this authority is unique to the criminal 
justice system. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 241 (1896) (holding that 
sentencing an immigrant to hard labor amounted to punitive punishment, which could only be 
inflicted on a person pursuant to the authority of the criminal justice system); see also David 
Cole, In Aid of Removal: Due Process Limits on Immigration Detention, 51 EMORY L.J. 1003, 
1006 n.14 (2002) (“The INS has no authority to detain aliens for any purposes other than 
prevention.”). As for the minority of immigrants who are detained on the basis of criminal 
conduct, they have all served their criminal sentences by the time they enter detention. See 
KERWIN & LIN, supra note 21, at 1 (finding that only 42 percent of detainees had criminal 
records). 
 86. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
 87. Id. at 747–48. 
 88. Id. at 742. 
 89. Id. at 742–43. 
 90. Id. at 751–52. 
 91. Id. at 747. 
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In its decision, the Court considered the Act’s legislative 
purpose: to prevent a limited class of felons from committing 
additional crimes while released on bail.92 In light of the extensive 
procedural protections afforded to arrestees, the Court determined 
that pretrial detention was not excessive in relation to that purpose.93 
In reaching its decision, the Court emphasized that pretrial 
detention could only be sought for the “most serious of crimes” and 
observed that there were “stringent time limitations.”94 The Court 
also mentioned that excessively prolonged pretrial detention would 
be punitive and therefore unconstitutional.95 Finally, the Court stated 
that because the Bail Reform Act authorized pretrial detention only 
after the state carried a substantial burden, it was not a “scattershot 
attempt to incapacitate” all persons who were suspected of 
committing serious crimes.96 
In upholding pretrial detention, the Court also pointed to the 
procedural rights afforded to the arrestee; namely, the Bail Reform 
Act required an adversarial hearing regarding the arrestee’s 
dangerousness and placed strict time limits on pretrial detention. 
In nonimmigration contexts, the Supreme Court continues to 
uphold the use of preventive detention when Salerno-type 
protections are present;97 however, when these protections are absent, 
the Court holds that preventive detention is unconstitutional.98 
 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 746–48. 
 94. Id. at 747. 
 95. Id. However, the Court declined to answer at what point detention would be considered 
excessively prolonged. Id. at 747 n.4. 
 96. Id. at 750. 
 97. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 362–64, 371 (1997) (upholding the 
preventive detention of sexual predators because the detention was preceded by an adversarial 
hearing that afforded the individual robust procedural protections, including the right to state-
funded counsel, the right to present and cross-examine witnesses, and the right to an annual case 
review to determine if detention was still warranted). 
 98. See, e.g., Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 81–82 (1992) (holding that the preventive 
detention of an insanity acquitee violated due process because the authorizing statute lacked the 
procedural protections central to the holding in Salerno, and stating “[u]nlike the sharply focused 
scheme at issue in Salerno, the Louisiana scheme of confinement is not carefully limited.”); see 
also Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 415 (2002) (holding that a state law authorizing the civil 
commitment of sex offenders was unconstitutional because it did not require an adversarial 
hearing as to whether the offender lacked control over the dangerous behavior). 
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III.  CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT:  
PUNISHMENT THAT  
FITS NO CRIME 
Given the ubiquitous nature of Salerno-type protections in other 
preventive detention schemes, it is striking that virtually no 
protections attach to immigration detention. Immigrants are not 
entitled to pre-detention adversarial hearings concerning whether 
they pose a threat to their community or are likely to abscond.99 If an 
immigrant seeks to challenge discretionary detention, he or she, 
rather than the government, carries the burden of proof.100 Even if an 
immigration judge determines that the immigrant is eligible for 
parole, DHS can override this decision and require continued 
detention.101 If an immigrant wants to challenge mandatory detention 
based on criminal offenses, the immigrant carries a heavy burden of 
proof and must show that the government is substantially unlikely to 
prevail.102 Furthermore, there is no time limit imposed on pre-
removal order detention.103 Detention is not restricted to the “most 
serious” crimes, as an immigrant can be detained based on relatively 
minor traffic-related offenses104 or simply for requesting political 
asylum.105 ICE does not conduct individual assessments to determine 
whether conditions of release could serve state ends,106 and 
immigrants are often detained among criminal populations107 and in 
settings where the conditions of confinement do not reflect the 
 
 99. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003). 
 100. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 6. 
 101. Michael S. Vastine, Good Things Come to Those Who Wait? Reconsidering 
Indeterminate and Indefinite Detention as Tools in U.S. Immigration Policy, 5 INTERCULTURAL 
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 125, 147–48 (2010). 
 102. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 6. 
 103. Id. 
 104. KERWIN & LIN, supra note 21, at 2 (“The ‘most serious’ convictions for nearly 20 
percent of criminal aliens in ICE custody were for traffic-related (13 percent) and immigration-
related (6 percent) offenses.”). 
 105. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(IV) (2006). 
 106. Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration Detention, 45 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 601, 610–13 (2010) (discussing how immigration detention has shifted 
from a system that utilized parole to a system that now prohibits release on parole for mandatory 
holds). 
 107. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 77, at 37. 
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regulatory purpose of detention. Finally, immigrants in detention 
have no right to government-funded counsel.108 
The absence of Salerno-type procedural safeguards in 
immigration proceedings is troubling, especially in light of the 
current state of the immigration detention system. The system is so 
drastically and fundamentally broken that even if there were full-
fledged procedural safeguards in place, it would still be 
constitutionally suspect for the government to place anyone in 
detention. Therefore, in an effort to reveal what is truly at stake for 
those who are detained without procedural protections, this part will 
provide an analysis of the problems that occur at the ground level of 
immigration detention. 
The immigration detention system is broken for two reasons. 
First, the system is civil only in theory; in practice, it is very much a 
punitive institution.109 Second, the system is not governed by binding 
regulation.110 Together these defects generate a host of problems for 
detainees and cast serious doubt on the constitutionality of the entire 
system. 
A.  Although Purportedly Civil,  
the Detention System Is Highly Punitive 
Within the current immigration detention model, it is impossible 
to draw any meaningful distinction between civil custody and penal 
incarceration.111 Detainees are often handcuffed or shackled, 
subjected to invasive body searches, and forced to stand for hours 
during bed checks.112 They face severe limitations on visitation, 
movement, and recreation as well as limited access to legal and 
medical services.113 Many detainees are even housed in jails and are 
sometimes—in contravention of detention standards—commingled 
 
 108. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 8. 
 109. See, e.g., Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign 
Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 376 (2006) (“[I]mmigration law and the criminal justice system 
are merely nominally separate.”). 
 110. See Tumlin, supra note 23, at 1. 
 111. See Stumpf, supra note 109, at 376. 
 112. See Riddhi Mukhopadhyay, Death in Detention: Medical and Mental Health 
Consequences of Indefinite Detention of Immigrants in the United States, 7 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. 
JUST. 693, 707–08 (2009). 
 113. Id. at 708. 
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with the criminal population.114 Given the prevalence of jail 
violence,115 this commingling threatens the security and physical 
well-being of the detained immigrants. Moreover, guards at 
commingled facilities do not differentiate between the two 
populations and reportedly treat immigrant detainees in the same 
way that they treat criminal convicts.116 In one instance, five Bureau 
of Prison officials admitted during an interview that they did not 
know immigration-specific detention standards even existed, so they 
trained their corrections officers to treat detainees in the same way 
that they treated inmates.117 The deprivations and dangers that 
detainees face in immigration detention are thus virtually 
indistinguishable from those that criminal inmates face in jail.118 This 
similitude raises constitutional concerns for a number of reasons. 
1.  The Current Immigration Detention System  
Is Excessive in Relation to Its Regulatory Goal 
The immigration detention system should be narrowly tailored 
to serve its administrative function, as detention that is excessive in 
light of its stated purpose is unconstitutional.119 The immigration 
detention system, however, has strayed significantly from its 
purported goals. It is designed to serve an administrative, civil 
purpose, yet it closely mirrors penal incarceration. As a result, 
immigration detention is both excessive and unconstitutional. 
Although nominally civil, immigration detention is very much a 
punitive system. The correlation between immigration detention and 
prison is troubling because the two systems are based on divergent 
governmental objectives. Criminal incarceration is meant to punish 
 
 114. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 77, at 37. 
 115. John J. Gibbons & Nicholas de B. Katzenbach, Confronting Confinement, 22 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 385, 399 (2006) (“There is disturbing evidence of individual assaults and patterns 
of violence in some U.S. prisons and jails . . . . Former prisoners recounted gang violence, rape, 
[and] beatings by officers . . . .”). 
 116. GORDON, supra note 28, § 108.04(2)(a) (citation omitted). 
 117. Brané & Lundholm, supra note 25, at 161–62 (citing OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., No. OIG-07-01, TREATMENT OF IMMIGRATION DETAINEES HOUSED 
AT IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT FACILITIES 31 (2006), available at 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/library/P1598.pdf). 
 118. See, e.g., Raha Jorjani, U.S. Immigration Detention: Policy and Procedure from a 
Human Rights Perspective, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV. 89, 91 (“To an individual who 
is behind bars, the difference between ‘prison’ and ‘detention’ is purely academic.”). 
 119. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746–47 (1987). 
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persons for past criminal conduct,120 while immigration detention is 
merely an administrative tool designed to facilitate efforts to remove 
deportable immigrants.121 Most immigrants in detention are not 
criminals at all,122 so there is no legal or moral basis on which to 
subject them to punishment. Further, the state has no interest in 
incarcerating detainees who have already completed their criminal 
sentences by the time they enter the immigration detention system.123 
Therefore, the punitive aspects of detention are necessarily excessive 
in light of the system’s nonpunitive purpose. 
Many conditions of detention—including overcrowding, lack of 
adequate visitation hours, insufficient ventilation, poor food, 
inadequate water, unclean quarters, malfunctioning toilets, and both 
verbal and physical abuse inflicted by inmates and guards124—are 
utterly indefensible, as such conditions are egregious even in the 
penitentiary context. 
2.  Criminal Conditions Without Criminal Protections 
The similarity between immigration detention and criminal 
incarceration is problematic because immigrant detainees are not 
entitled to the same constitutional protections that their criminal 
counterparts enjoy.125 Most strikingly, immigrants in detention are 
not entitled to government-funded counsel.126 As a result, most 
 
 120. See DANIEL E. HALL., CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 29 (5th ed. 2009) 
(“[P]unishment through the criminal justice system is society’s method of avenging a wrong. The 
idea that one who commits a wrong must be punished is an old one.”). 
 121. See Mukhopadhyay, supra note 112, at 694; see also Raha Jorjani, Ignoring the Court’s 
Order: The Automobile Stay in Immigration Detention Cases, 5 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 89, 91 (2009) (noting that immigration detention is governed by civil, administrative laws). 
 122. KERWIN & LIN, supra note 21, at 1 (finding that 58 percent of detainees did not have 
criminal records). 
 123. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 558 n.14 (2003) (Souter, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (noting that the State of California has no interest in further detention after 
a detainee has completed his or her criminal sentence). 
 124. Kalhan, supra note 69, at 47 (citing AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 77, at 29–43). 
 125. See Brané & Lundholm, supra note 25, at 151 (“[A] person detained under immigration 
law is not protected by the same rights and safeguards as someone in the criminal process.” 
(citing DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS 
IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 34 (2003))); see also Cole, supra note 85, at 1014 (“The fact that the 
Constitution limits the imposition of custody in the bail and civil commitment settings does not 
necessarily mean that it constrains immigration detention to the same extent . . . immigration 
exceptionalism is well-documented . . . . ”). As Part IV, infra, will explain, detainees awaiting 
deportation do not even receive the same procedural protections that detainees in other forms of 
civil detention do. 
 126. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 8. 
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immigrants represent themselves in deportation hearings,127 despite 
the fact that the stakes are very high,128 the law is very complex,129 
and language barriers tend to complicate the entire process.130 Pro 
bono legal services are often unobtainable because detention 
facilities are located in remote areas of the country;131 where such 
services are available, transfers frequently disrupt whatever attorney-
client relationships that may have formed.132 Because the conditions 
of immigration detention mirror those of penal incarceration, and 
because a rapidly growing number of immigrants are detained and 
subjected to these conditions each year, “legal representation during 
removal proceedings is more important than ever.”133 
3.  Confinement as an Obstruction to Justice 
The conditions of confinement are problematic because they 
keep many immigrants from pursuing meritorious claims to stay in 
the country.134 Although DHS135 and the Supreme Court136 both insist 
that immigration detention is a short-term measure designed to 
facilitate removal hearings, “in reality, it becomes a long, unbearable 
process for most.”137 Many immigrants simply cannot endure the 
 
 127. Id.; Cole, supra note 85, at 35 (“Eighty percent of immigration detainees are 
unrepresented.”). 
 128. Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469, 479 (1963) (“[D]eportation is a drastic 
sanction, one which can destroy lives and disrupt families . . . .”). 
 129. Castro-O’Ryan v. U.S. Dep’t of Immigration & Naturalization, 847 F.2d 1307, 1312 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (“[T]he immigration laws have been termed ‘second only to the Internal Revenue Code 
in complexity.’” (quoting E. HULL, WITHOUT JUSTICE FOR ALL 107 (1985))). 
 130. Brané & Lundholm, supra note 25, at 160 (“Interpretation services in detention are 
frequently unavailable or insufficient.”). 
 131. See Mukhopadhyay, supra note 112, at 705 (“Even if [asylum seekers] are able to find 
an attorney who is willing to assist them, it is difficult for the asylum seeker to meet and work 
with the attorney due to the isolated location of many detention facilities.”). 
 132. See CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 10 (recommending that before transfer 
decisions are made, agencies should take into consideration whether transferring a detainee will 
adversely affect an existing attorney-client relationship). 
 133. Id. at 8. 
 134. See Brané & Lundholm, supra note 25, at 160 (“The hardships of detention often force 
asylum seekers to abandon meritorious claims, simply in order to gain release.”). 
 135. See Mukhopadhyay, supra note 112, at 694 (noting that DHS classifies detention as a 
nonpunitive, short-term administrative measure to ensure noncitizens appear at their immigration 
hearing). 
 136. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 528 (2003) (distinguishing the case from precedent, 
where post-removal order detention was held to be potentially indefinite on the grounds that pre-
removal order detention is “of a much shorter duration” than post-removal order detention). 
 137. Mukhopadhyay, supra note 112, at 704. 
 
Summer 2011] PREVENTIVE DETENTION DISTORTED 1497 
harsh, highly punitive conditions of confinement; consequently, they 
often voluntarily deport themselves through a process known as 
stipulated removal.138 In 2004, the year when the government 
implemented the stipulated removal procedure, there were only 5,481 
stipulated removal orders; the following year that number nearly 
tripled; and, by 2008, the number of stipulated removals was 
projected to reach 34,890.139 
This phenomenon, where immigrants voluntarily abandon their 
claims in order to escape the suffering that they experience in 
detention, is perhaps most tragic with respect to asylum-seekers and 
torture survivors. These individuals come to the United States to 
escape state-sponsored abuse and torture, and they are undoubtedly 
astonished and disheartened to learn that they will be detained in jail-
like facilities and treated like prisoners while their asylum 
applications are processed.140 This detention, moreover, can stand in 
the way of just resolution of asylum petitions.141 Without proper 
medical and mental health support, asylum-seekers have difficulty 
processing and articulating the abuse that they have endured; thus, 
they are less likely to win their cases,142 especially if they are 
representing themselves without the support of counsel, which, as 
mentioned above, is often the reality.143 What is more, asylum-
seekers and torture survivors are especially vulnerable to the 
inhumane and prison-like conditions of detention and can actually be 
retraumatized by their experiences in confinement.144 As a result, 
 
 138. Stipulated removal is a procedure, authorized by IIRIRA, that enables noncitizens to 
waive their rights to a hearing and any relief from removal without ever appearing before an 
immigration judge. See NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., OVERVIEW OF KEY IMMIGRATION 
ISSUES FACING THE IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS MOVEMENT 3 (2009), available at http:// 
www.nilc.org/dc_conf/flashdrive09/Immigration-Law-and-Enforcement/imm1_imm-issues-
overview-2009-11-05.pdf. 
 139. Jayashri Srikantiah & Karen Tumlin, Backgrounder: Stipulated Removal, IMMIGRANTS’ 
RTS. CLINIC, 1, http://www.law.stanford.edu/program/clinics/immigrantsrights/pressrelease/ 
Stipulated_removal_backgrounder.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2011). 
 140. Mukhopadhyay, supra note 112, at 705. 
 141. Id. (“Inhumane and prison-like detention conditions can hinder an immigrant’s ability to 
discuss his or her claim . . . . If the asylum seeker is unable to testify about the persecution she 
suffered, an asylum officer or immigration judge may inaccurately conclude that the asylum 
seeker is not credible and is therefore ineligible for asylum.”). 
 142. Id. 
 143. CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 8. 
 144. Mukhopadhyay, supra note 112, at 709 (explaining how the prison-like conditions and 
treatment in detention facilities compound asylum seekers’ trauma). 
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these immigrants are more likely to forgo their claims and stipulate 
to their removal simply in order to get out of detention.145 
Unfortunately, the immigrants who have suffered the most—
such as victims of torture, rape, and prosecutions—are most 
vulnerable to harsh detention conditions. Unable to withstand the 
environment, they therefore are the first to give up their claims.146 
B.  The Detention System Is Dangerously Unregulated 
The second major problem with the immigration detention 
system is the lack of binding regulation. Neither the former National 
Detention Standards nor the recently promulgated PBNDS carry the 
force of law.147 Because there are no enforceable rules in place, there 
is no way to hold facilities accountable when they fail to maintain 
suitable detention standards. Indeed, part of the problem stems from 
the fact that detention officials have broad discretion when it comes 
to defining what is suitable.148 
1.  The Regulation Gap 
The lack of regulation has allowed the detention system to 
deteriorate to the point where the conditions of confinement are not 
only punitive but also inhumane.149 Reform advocates point to the 
absence of binding regulation as a cause of the high number of 
deaths, suicides, and human-rights abuses that have occurred in 
immigration detention facilities in recent years.150 Moreover, the lack 
of enforceable regulation has created a significant gap between 
 
 145. See Marisa Silenzi Cianciarulo, The Trafficking and Exploitation Victims Assistance 
Program: A Proposed Early Response Plan for Victims of International Trafficking in the United 
States, 38 N.M. L. REV. 373, 405 (2008) (“[Detention has] a severe negative psychological 
impact, resulting in many bona fide refugees giving up their asylum claims and accepting 
deportation rather than remaining incarcerated.”). 
 146. See id. at 709–11. 
 147. TUMLIN, supra note 23, at 4–5. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OPERATIONS 
MANUAL ICE PERFORMANCE BASED NATIONAL DETENTION STANDARDS (2008), available at 
http://www.ice.gov/detention-standards/2008/, to review the PBNDS. 
 148. TUMLIN, supra note 23, at 8 (“Excessive reliance on reviewer discretion and ‘good 
judgment’ rendered ICE’s self-reviews inherently unreliable, as review findings could neither be 
replicated by other reviewers nor meaningfully evaluated for accuracy.”). 
 149. See, e.g., Brané & Lundholm, supra note 25, at 160 (“[T]he conditions themselves may 
also infringe on human rights guarantees.”). 
 150. Kalhan, supra note 69, at 47 (“These deprivations have been exacerbated by a range of 
detention related policies and practices . . . . Over 100 detainees have died in custody since 2003, 
often due to neglect of their health needs.”). 
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detention standards—which, although nonbinding, are intended to 
govern the general affairs of detention facilities151—and everyday 
detention practices.152 For instance, there have been reports of 
inadequate medical care,153 failures to provide law libraries and 
access to updated legal materials,154 breaches of visitation and phone-
access policies,155 violations of recreation standards,156 
overcrowding,157 excessive use of force, abuse by detention guards,158 
and sexual misconduct on the part of the staff.159 ICE has also been 
criticized for both failing to report and covering up160 deaths of 
persons in detention. In addition, the staggering rate of detainee 
 
 151. GORDON, supra note 28, § 108.04(1)(b)–(c). 
 152. TUMLIN, supra note 23, at vi. 
 153. Id. at xi (“[O]ver 30 facilities failed to provide segregated detainees with required health 
care visits.”); id. at 73 (“Facilities failed to provide adequate medical screening of newly arriving 
detainees.”). 
 154. Id. at 33 (“29 detention facilities lacked an actual law library . . . . Law libraries at 59 
facilities did not contain some or all of the required legal material . . . . 30 facilities failed to 
designate an employee to update legal material . . . . 27 facilities inappropriately limited 
detainees’ access to their law libraries . . . . 15 facilities failed to equip their law libraries with any 
typewriters or computers . . . . 20 facilities had inadequate numbers of computers or 
typewriters . . . .”). 
 155. Id. at 15 (“Over 60 facilities failed to post a list of pro bono legal services 
organizations . . . . 17 facilities failed to provide detainees the option of avoiding a strip search by 
choosing that a visit be ‘noncontact.’”); id. (“More than a dozen facilities failed to allow detainees 
in disciplinary segregation access to legal visits.”); id. at 27 (finding, based on American Bar 
Association (ABA) and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reports, 
that thirty facilities did not provide a reasonable degree of privacy for legal phone calls, thirty-
two facilities failed to allow detainees to make special access calls, and nineteen facilities did not 
have a system in place for taking emergency phone messages). 
 156. Id. at 21–22 (according to ABA and UNHCR reports, forty-one facilities failed to 
provide detainees the minimum amount of recreation time; nineteen facilities had no outdoor 
programs; six facilities lacked an indoor recreation program; one facility provided neither outdoor 
nor indoor recreation programs; and eighteen facilities provided recreation areas that could not 
accommodate all detainees). 
 157. Id. at 46. 
 158. Id. at 49 (according to ICE, eleven facilities imposed one or more of the following 
sanctions against detention policies: corporal punishment; deprivation of food, exercise, clothing, 
or personal hygiene items; and withholding of correspondence privileges). According to 
independent reviewers, impermissible and retaliatory discipline was a common problem and 
violations included: deprivation of recreation and library time, deprivation of hygiene items, and 
use of corporal punishment, including shackling. Id. 
 159. GORDON, supra note 28, § 108.04(2)(b), (d), (e). 
 160. See Nina Bernstein, Officials Hid Truth of Immigrant Deaths in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 
2010, at A1 (discussing numerous incidents where immigrants died or suffered horrendous abuse 
in detention and how officials covered up the details of such incidents). 
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depression161 and the high number of documented suicides indicate 
that immigrants in detention do not receive the appropriate level of 
physical and psychological care that they require.162 
The true extent of these problems and abuses is largely 
unknown. The government has maintained a “deliberate policy of 
opaqueness” with respect to the results of facility audits.163 ICE has 
refused to release the results of its annual reviews, and the only two 
agencies that have been permitted to conduct their own audits, the 
American Bar Association (ABA) and the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), have gained access to the 
facilities on the condition that their findings remain confidential.164 
2.  The Privatization of Human Suffering 
Additionally, the lack of regulatory oversight is even more 
dangerous due to the privatization of many detention centers. As 
indicated above, ICE relies heavily on private companies to provide 
staff, management, and supervision to immigration detention 
facilities. In fact, the majority of detainees (51 percent) are 
distributed between seventeen densely populated “mega-jail”165 
facilities, and more than 37 percent of all detainees are held in 
 
 161. See Lisa A. Cahan, Constitutional Protections of Aliens: A Call for Action to Provide 
Adequate Health Care for Immigration Detainees, 3 J. OF HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 343, 365 
n.96 (noting that 86 percent of asylum-seekers in detention suffer from high levels of depression); 
see also Mukhopadhyay, supra note 112, at 709–10 (noting that conservative estimates from ICE 
estimate that at least 15 percent of the general detainee population suffer from depression and 
other mental illnesses). 
 162. Mukhopadhyay, supra note 112, at 709–10. 
 163. TUMLIN, supra note 23, at vi. 
 164. Id. at 1 (noting that ABA and UNHCR audit results are shared with ICE only). Pieces of 
the ABA and UNHCR audits have recently become available to the public pursuant to court-
ordered discovery. Id. at 2 (“This information was released only as a result of court-ordered 
discovery in Orantes-Hernandez v. Holder.”). However, the government withheld a substantial 
amount of the information that it was ordered to turn over. Id. (“[The government] withheld 
information on detention facilities’ compliance with 20 of the 38 national detention 
standards . . . . The government also failed to produce all facility reviews conducted by ICE 
during 2004 and 2005, despite the court order to do so . . . . [I]t became clear that ICE had 
withheld facility reviews for at least 133 facilities that it reviewed in 2004 and 2005.”). 
 165. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, U.S. DETENTION OF ASYLUM SEEKERS: SEEKING PROTECTION, 
FINDING PRISON 25 (2009), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/pdf/090429-RP-hrf-
asylum-detention-report.pdf (noting that these detention centers have been described as “mega-
jails”). 
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facilities managed by private contractors.166 Only two mega-jails are 
directly managed by localities.167 Because private contractors play a 
significant role in the daily operation of detention facilities, the goals 
of the detention system have become intertwined with those of a for-
profit business enterprise.168 This confusion is exacerbated because 
the companies are not constrained by binding regulation but instead 
have great discretion over how they conduct their businesses.169 
Accordingly, under both the old detention standards and the new 
PBNDS, compliance is largely self-monitored by the companies 
running the facilities—companies that often have their eyes on 
turning a profit.170 The ramifications of using an “honor system” to 
regulate the behavior of profit-driven companies are readily 
apparent. 
A private detention company, like any other business, faces 
incentives to increase its profit margin.171 When profit margins cause 
a detention company to cut corners and save costs, that leads to 
substandard care and serious infringements of detainees’ rights.172 In 
fact, independent agency reviews of detention facilities indicated 
“widespread and severe” violations of the national detention 
standards,173 yet ICE consistently overlooked the reports and granted 
 
 166. KERWIN & LIN, supra note 21, at 14–15 (demonstrating that 12,159 of the 32,000 
detainees held in mega-jail facilities—or 37.99 percent—are detained in facilities managed by 
private contractors). 
 167. Id. 
 168. See Robert Koulish, Blackwater and the Privatization of Immigration Control, 20 ST. 
THOMAS L. REV. 462, 489 (2007) (“[T]he privatization of immigration control also further 
diminishes chances for individual and social redress against an increasingly tyrannical system that 
is fueled by turning taxpayer revenue into corporate profits.”). 
 169. Id. at 473 (“Consider a field of law in which officials may gather and use secret 
evidence, expedited removals, no review of final orders of removal, mandatory and indefinite 
detention, secretive changes of venue, exorbitant bonds, restricted access to counsel and restricted 
judicial review. Now consider the privatization of this process where employees . . . have nearly 
unchecked discretion to decide the fate of asylum applicants and immigrants at our borders.”). 
 170. Private detention is a lucrative business. See Mukhopadhyay, supra note 112, at 702–03. 
The two largest corporations behind the detention business are GEO Group and Corrections 
Corporation of America, and they can charge the government anywhere from $30 million to 
$60 million a year to run a single facility. Id. 
 171. Donna Red Wing, Every Prisoner a Profit Centre: Every Immigrant a Business 
Opportunity, OPENDEMOCRACY (Sept. 29, 2010, 1:43 PM), http://www.opendemocracy.net/ 
donna-red-wing/every-prisoner-profit-centre-every-immigrant-business-opportunity-1 (“As in any 
big business, the profit motive rules.”). 
 172. Mukhopadhyay, supra note 112, at 703 (“[T]he high cost of detention results in high 
profits for private corporations who are able to cut corners in detainee treatment.”). 
 173. TUMLIN, supra note 23, at viii. 
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the companies tremendous discretion to regulate themselves.174 
Through ICE’s willingness to turn a blind eye to documented 
violations of its own standards, the government has sent a dangerous 
message to detention companies that “noncompliance carries no real 
penalty.”175 
One might expect these defects in the detention system to be 
counterbalanced by unassailably constitutional pre-detention 
procedures. But, as will be demonstrated below, this is far from the 
case. 
IV.  PREVENTIVE DETENTION  
CANNOT PERSIST  
WITHOUT PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS 
As indicated above, immigration detention is preventive 
detention, and yet none of the usual preventive-detention safeguards 
apply. Although all of the procedural protections advanced in 
Salerno seem equally probative in the context of immigration 
detention, this part will focus on the importance of adversarial 
hearings and time constraints on the duration of detention. These two 
protections not only inhere in most, if not all, preventive detention 
schemes apart from immigration detention but they seem to be the 
hallmark of constitutionally sound civil detention.176 
Preventive detention ceases to be preventive when there is 
nothing to prevent. Accordingly, there should be an individualized 
assessment to determine whether or not the government’s interest is 
even implicated, before an immigrant is locked away. Furthermore, 
there should be limitations on the length of detention because, as the 
Supreme Court indicated in Salerno, when detention becomes 
prolonged and thus excessive in relation to the state interest, the 
nature of the detention changes from civil (and constitutional) to 
punitive (and unconstitutional).177 
 
 174. Id. at 12. 
 175. Id. at 1. 
 176. In addition, some of the other protections—for instance the notion that the conditions of 
confinement should reflect the state’s regulatory purpose and the mandate that detainees should 
not be intermingled with the criminal population—are incorporated into Part III of this Article, 
supra, as part of a critique of the current conditions of confinement. 
 177. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 n.4 (1987). 
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As will be demonstrated in Part V, there is no principled 
justification for discarding these two protections when it comes to 
immigration detention. This is especially true given that the courts 
have recently bestowed greater due process rights on immigrants178 
and have pulled in the reins on the government’s plenary power over 
immigration issues.179 
A.  Detaining Persons Without  
Individualized Hearings Is Unconstitutional 
Currently, immigrants who are subject to mandatory detention 
are detained without any assessment as to whether they are 
dangerous or likely to abscond.180 In other words, they are detained 
without an assessment as to whether their confinement furthers state 
interests. Instead, the system essentially presupposes that every 
immigrant who is subject to mandatory detention is either dangerous 
or a flight risk, or both.181 However, some immigrants who are placed 
in removal proceedings are neither dangerous nor likely to 
abscond.182 Detaining these individuals, when it is not in the 
government’s interest to do so, arbitrarily deprives them of their 
fundamental right to liberty. 
Individualized hearings are necessary because not all removable 
immigrants are dangerous.183 Some immigrants who face mandatory 
detention have never been convicted of a crime, and thus the 
government has no reason to automatically presume that they pose a 
 
 178. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690, 701 (2001) (indicating that a statute 
authorizing indefinite detention would violate noncitizens’ constitutional rights, and holding that 
a statute authorizing post-removal order detention included an implicit reasonableness limitation 
of six months); see also Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 386–87 (2005) (extending the right to 
be free from indefinite post-removal order detention to inadmissible noncitizens); Tijani v. Willis, 
430 F.3d 1241, 1249–50 (9th Cir. 2005) (extending the right to be free from indefinite detention 
to pre-removal order detainee). 
 179. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695 (indicating that the plenary power doctrine does not grant 
the government with the authority to indefinitely detain an immigrant who has been ordered 
removed but is not removable); see also Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478, 485 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(indicating that even though a detainee had a violent criminal history and suffered from a mental 
condition that increased the likelihood of future dangerousness, the government’s plenary powers 
do not authorize a continued detention on these grounds when removal is not foreseeable). 
 180. See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003). 
 181. See id. at 528–31. 
 182. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 208–09 (1953); supra 
Part I. 
 183. See supra Part I. 
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danger to their communities.184 Even when detention is based on past 
criminal conduct, the types of crimes that trigger mandatory 
detention do not always correlate with future danger.185 A broad 
swath of criminal charges trigger mandatory detention,186 and each 
charge is not necessarily probative of an immigrant’s propensity for 
violence.187 For example, the triggering offense might be a 
misdemeanor, a relatively minor traffic offense, or a nonviolent 
crime, such as money laundering.188 
In contrast, in Salerno, the Bail Reform Act authorized detention 
only when a person committed a “crime of violence.”189 The fact that 
the Act only authorized preventive detention when the arrestee was 
charged with a “crime of violence” supplied an important link 
between the individual detainee and the state interest, because the 
Act only applied when what the person did increased the probability 
that the person would endanger his or her community.190 
Notwithstanding this correlation, the arrestee was still entitled to an 
adversarial hearing.191 
In the immigration context, not only is the link between the act 
that triggers mandatory detention and the governmental purpose for 
the detention more tenuous but there are no additional procedural 
safeguards in place. Although removal of nonviolent criminal 
immigrants may serve legitimate policy objectives, the mere 
existence of a criminal conviction alone is not enough to justify 
detention. Thus, because there is no automatic correlation between 
the offenses that trigger mandatory detention and the government’s 
 
 184. See Shaughnessy, 345 U.S. at 208–09. 
 185. See Shalini Bhargava, Detaining Due Process: The Need for Procedural Reform in 
“Joseph” Hearings After Demore v. Kim, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 51, 53 (2006) 
(noting that Congress, through the mandatory detention statutes, created an irrebuttable 
presumption of dangerousness and risk of flight, and arguing that this presumption is dubious in 
light of the crimes that trigger mandatory detention). 
 186. Id. at 58 (noting that a wide range of criminal offenses—money laundering, theft 
offenses, receiving a firearm through interstate commerce while being an unlawful user of 
controlled substances, trafficking in vehicles, offenses related to perjury, and passport 
mutilation—qualify as aggravated felonies for purposes of mandatory detention) (citing 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43)(A), (D), (G), (P), (R), (S) (2000); id. § 1101(a)(43)(E)(ii) (2002)). 
 187. See Bhargava, supra note 185. 
 188. Id. at 58. 
 189. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750–51, 755 (1987). 
 190. Id. at 739. 
 191. Id. at 755. 
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interest in protecting the public, individualized hearings must be 
utilized. 
Similarly, without an assessment as to whether the immigrant 
poses a flight risk, there is no way to tell whether detention is 
necessary to ensure that an immigrant shows up to his or her removal 
hearings or whether a less invasive and less expensive alternative, 
such as release on parole, could accomplish the same goal. Certain 
groups of noncitizens are inherently less likely to abscond, and thus 
their detention, unless it is based on dangerousness, is unnecessary.192 
For instance, a lawful permanent resident with a job, a family, and 
strong ties to his community does not pose a significant risk of 
flight.193 Asylum-seekers are also highly unlikely to abscond and skip 
their removal hearings because, by seeking asylum, they are 
voluntarily submitting themselves to the administrative process. 
Vinodbhai Patel’s story, discussed above, exemplifies the 
injustice in detaining nondangerous individuals who pose no real 
flight risk. The INS detained Mr. Patel for almost a year during 
removal proceedings, despite his having strong social and family ties 
that seemed to mitigate any danger of flight.194 Nondangerous 
persons like Mr. Patel, who are unlikely to run away and subvert the 
administrative process because of their legitimate legal status and 
their strong community ties, should not be placed in detention. 
In Demore v. Kim195 the majority challenged this conclusion by 
pointing to a study that found that more than 20 percent of deportable 
criminal aliens released on bond failed to show up to removal 
hearings.196 From this statistic, the Court drew the conclusion that it 
is constitutionally permissible to detain all immigrants as a 
prophylactic measure.197 The statistic, however, was misleading.198 As 
 
 192. See, e.g., Renee Feltz, Feds Push Detention Reforms Amid Record Number of 
Deportations, NEED TO KNOW ON PBS (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/need-to-
know/security/feds-push-detention-reforms-amid-record-number-of-deportations/4341/ 
(“[D]etention remains the norm for immigrants brought into custody after living in the United 
States, even those who have children or family ties here that make them less of a flight risk.”). 
 193. See Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 4, Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(No. 01-2398), abrogated by Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 194. Id. at 5–6. 
 195. 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 196. Id. at 519–20 (stating that detention is needed in order to avoid an “unacceptable rate of 
flight”). 
 197. Id. at 531. 
 198. See id. at 563–64 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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the dissent pointed out, the data were based on a test study in 
response to overcrowding.199 This overcrowding forced ICE to 
haphazardly release a percentage of immigrants on bail.200 ICE paid 
no attention to individual circumstances, such as whether the 
immigrant had strong ties to the community, a job, a family, or a 
history of absconding.201 Thus, the persons who were released were 
not necessarily persons who posed low risks of flight. It is fair to 
presume that had ICE conducted assessments and released only those 
who were favorable candidates, far fewer noncitizens would have 
absconded. 
In fact, the dissent pointed to a more recent study that found that 
92 percent of criminal aliens who were released under supervisory 
conditions actually attended all of their hearings.202 The institute that 
conducted the study applied various screening criteria, such as 
strength of family and community ties, before selecting candidates 
for release, thereby simulating the type of procedure that would 
likely be used if ICE were to implement individualized hearings.203 
In any event, the fact that a portion of immigrants will abscond 
does not authorize the government to detain all immigrants without 
any assessment.204 In 2001, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit made this point when it held that the government violated due 
process by mandatorily detaining a noncitizen without making an 
individualized determination of his risk of flight or danger to the 
community.205 The court reasoned that even if 90 percent of released 
noncitizens would abscond during the removal process, it is 
nevertheless unjust to imprison the 10 percent who would dutifully 
report to their hearings.206 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 565. 
 203. Id. at 520 n.5 (majority opinion); id. at 565 n.21 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 204. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text. 
 205. Patel v. Zemski, 275 F.3d 299, 314 (3d Cir. 2001), abrogated by Demore v. Kim, 538 
U.S. 510 (2003). 
 206. Id. at 311–13. 
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The current immigration detention system is extremely 
clumsy.207 All immigrants who are subject to expedited removal are 
lumped into one category: persons who are dangerous or likely to 
abscond.208 But, without an individualized determination, it is 
impossible to know which immigrants are dangerous or likely to 
abscond. As one lower court pointed out, “The requirement of an 
individualized hearing would infuse the detention process with the 
accuracy and precision that it currently lacks.”209 As it stands now, 
the system deprives many individuals of their fundamental right to 
freedom without furthering any government goal.210 
B.  Without Parameters on the Length of Detention,  
Detention Can Become Excessively  
Prolonged and Unconstitutional 
Time limits are important because immigration detention can 
last for months or even years.211 The Supreme Court has consistently 
held that prolonged detention raises constitutional concerns because 
when detention becomes excessive in light of the state interest, it 
ceases to be constitutional.212 Accordingly, the Court has struck down 
statutes for authorizing detention if the detention lacks an obvious 
termination point.213 Yet, the Court has failed to recognize that 
immigration detention is also without an obvious termination point 
and, in many instances, is excessive in light of its administrative 
purpose.214 
 
 207. See Demore, 538 U.S. at 550 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“We stressed [in Salerno] that the 
act was not a ‘scattershot attempt to incapacitate those who are merely suspected of’ serious 
offenses.” (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987))). 
 208. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 209. Patel, 275 F.3d at 312. 
 210. Id.; see Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 546–47 (1952); Singh v. Mule, No. 07-CV-
6387-CJS-VEB, 2009 WL 204618, at *6–7 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2009). 
 211. See, e.g., Nadarajah v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1071 (9th Cir. 2006) (ordering the 
release of an asylum-seeker who had been detained for almost five years despite having prevailed 
at every level of review and having never been charged of any crime); see also CONSTITUTION 
PROJECT, supra note 17, at 13 (indicating that immigrants are often detained for months, 
sometimes even years). 
 212. See, e.g., Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 n.4. 
 213. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 697 (2001). 
 214. See CONSTITUTION PROJECT, supra note 17, at 24 (“Although the Supreme Court has 
concluded that mandatory detention does not violate due process, that conclusion is based in part 
on the assumption that non-citizens in removal proceedings will be detained only for a ‘limited 
period.’ In reality, however, non-citizens are often detained for weeks or months, and some are 
even in detention for years.” (citing Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003))). 
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The Court’s misperception can be attributed to misleading 
statistics.215 Government-reported statistics on detention lengths are 
not comprehensive due to systemic inadequacies of ICE’s tracking 
system, which is the source of the raw numbers behind the 
statistics.216 The current tracking system allows some immigrants to 
fall through the cracks.217 These immigrants are never counted for 
purposes of data collection, yet their detentions drag on.218 
Furthermore, statistics about the average length of detention are often 
skewed because the data include stipulated removals.219 Immigrants 
who waive their right to go before a judge in order to expedite the 
removal process are obviously detained for a much shorter duration; 
indeed, that is the incentive.220 Stipulated removals, therefore, 
artificially draw down the average length of detention with respect to 
those who do decide to stay and challenge their removals. 
In 2003, in Demore v. Kim, Justice Souter, writing for the 
dissent, criticized the majority for using similarly skewed statistical 
data to support its contention that detention is generally of a short 
duration.221 Justice Souter believed that the statute authorizing 
mandatory detention of criminal aliens violated due process in part 
because removal proceedings have no deadline and may last more 
than a year.222 The majority, however, found that the detention was 
 
 215. See Kimere Jane Kimball, Note, A Right to Be Heard: Non-citizens’ Due Process Right 
to In-Person Hearings to Justify Their Detentions Pursuant to Removal, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 
159, 161 (2009) (noting that the Demore decision has received criticism because the majority 
relied on statistics regarding detention length that included people who chose immediate 
deportation). 
 216. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 77 (“The 
detainee tracking system, for five of the eight ICE facilities tested, did not always contain timely 
information. . . . At six of eight ICE detention facilities tested, [the Deportable Alien Control 
System] and detention facility records did not always agree on the location of detainees, or 
contained information showing the detainee had been deported.”). 
 217. Mukhopadhyay, supra note 112, at 704 (citing Amy Golstein & Dana Priest, Careless 
Detention: Medical Care in Immigrant Prisons, WASH. POST (SPECIAL SERIES), May 11–14, 
2008) (noting that many detainees slip through the cracks due to lack of representation or family 
to whom they can stay connected while in detention; thus, it is highly likely that some detainees 
have been in detention considerably longer than those in any of the publicized cases). 
 218. See id. 
 219. Brief for T. Alexander Aleinikoff et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Demore 
v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) (No. 011491), 2002 WL 31455523, at *3 (“[T]he median period of 
detention is misleading [sic] skewed as it is by the large number of detained aliens who concede 
deportability, do not apply for relief from removal and are promptly removed.”). 
 220. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 221. Demore, 538 U.S. at 567–68 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 222. Id. at 558. 
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not excessive because detentions, in most cases, lasted around forty-
seven days.223 The dissent pointed out that the majority relied on 
statistics that inaccurately portrayed the length of immigration 
detention.224 The forty-seven-day average counted from the time an 
immigrant received charging documents to the time of decision.225 It 
did not, therefore, capture the weeks or months that an immigrant 
can spend in detention before receiving charging documents.226 
Indeed, the MPI study discussed in Part II found that the average 
length of detention for pre-removal detainees was eighty-one days,227 
a conservative estimate given that the snapshot data were based on 
persons who remained in custody after the study concluded. 
Moreover, several circuit courts, faced with the question of 
whether detention in nonimmigration contexts has become prolonged 
and thus unconstitutional, conduct a case-by-case analysis in which 
they consider the strength of the state’s evidence indicating that the 
detainee poses a risk of flight or danger to the community.228 
However, if this balancing were applied to immigrants in detention, 
it seems that even a comparatively short time in detention would be 
considered prolonged. The state, having never conducted an 
individualized assessment, would have no evidence at all indicating 
that the immigrant poses a risk of flight or danger. Accordingly, 
because detention can become excessively prolonged in relation to 
its administrative purpose, immigration detention should be subject 
to stringent time limitations. 
 
 223. Id. at 529 (majority opinion). 
 224. Id. at 567–68 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 225. See id. 
 226. Id.; see also Bridget Kessler, Comment, In Jail, No Notice, No Hearing . . . No Problem? 
A Closer Look at Immigration Detention and the Due Process Standards of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 571, 573–76 (2009) (describing 
story of young Peruvian mother who was seven months pregnant when she was detained, who 
waited in detention for almost two months before she received her charging documents). 
 227. KERWIN & LIN, supra note 21, at 16. 
 228. See United States v. Hare, 873 F.2d 796, 801 (5th Cir. 1989) (“Like other circuits, we 
find that the due-process limit on the duration of preventive detention requires assessment on a 
case-by-case basis . . . . [A] court must consider . . . the strength of the government’s proof that 
the defendant poses a risk of flight or a danger to the community.” (citations omitted)). 
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V.  REBUTTING JUSTIFICATIONS  
FOR THE CURRENT  
IMMIGRATION DETENTION SYSTEM 
Given the importance of the two protections discussed above 
and the fact that they are extended in other preventive detention 
contexts, it is puzzling that they do not apply to immigration 
detention. Some have defended the current detention system on the 
grounds that noncitizens are not entitled to due process,229 or at least 
not the same level of due process that is afforded to citizens.230 
Others insist that immigration law is at the zenith of the 
government’s plenary power.231 Accordingly, Congress and the 
executive branch have virtually unbridled discretion to make 
immigration decisions.232 The next section entertains each of these 
justifications and then shows why they fail. As a result, there is no 
principled justification for the absence of Salerno-type protections in 
the context of preventive detention as used in immigration removal 
proceedings. 
A.  Illegal Immigrants and Removable  
Noncitizens Are Entitled to Due Process 
Some defend the current immigration detention system on 
grounds that illegal immigrants or removable noncitizens are not 
entitled to due process.233 The Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment prohibits the government from unfairly depriving 
 
 229. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 692 (“The Government argues that, from a 
constitutional perspective, alien status itself can justify indefinite detention.”). 
 230. Id. 
 231. See, e.g., id. at 695 (“The Government also looks for support to cases holding that 
Congress has ‘plenary power’ to create immigration law, and that the Judicial Branch must defer 
to Executive and Legislative Branch decision making in that area.”). 
 232. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: 
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J 545, 546–47 (1990) 
(describing a case involving an influx of Haitians seeking asylum in south Florida). 
 233. See, e.g., Gisbert v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1443 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding 
that continued detention of excludable aliens did not violate due process because the aliens had no 
liberty interest in being paroled); see also Maria V. Morris, The Exit Fiction: Unconstitutional 
Indefinite Detention of Deportable Aliens, 23 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 255, 278–80 (2001) (describing 
the theory that once an immigrant no longer has a right to remain in the United States, he or she 
can be expelled according to whatever process Congress mandates); id. at 275 (noting that under 
the entry fiction doctrine, immigration officials could parole a person into the United States 
without that person being considered to have entered the country for the purpose of constitutional 
due process protection). 
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persons of fundamental rights,234 including the right to be free from 
imprisonment, detention, or other forms of physical restraint.235 The 
Supreme Court has held that government detention violates due 
process unless it is ordered in a criminal proceeding with adequate 
procedural protections236 or in special nonpunitive situations237 where 
extenuating circumstances, such as a harm-threatening mental 
illness, outweigh the individual’s constitutionally protected liberty 
interest.238 As demonstrated above, immigration detention is not so 
narrowly tailored. Some have tried to justify this anomaly on 
grounds that due process guarantees simply do not extend to illegal 
immigrants.239 The logic goes: if an immigrant is removable, and thus 
does not have a right to be in the country, then the immigrant is not 
entitled to the protections that the Constitution affords.240 This 
position is in discord with both the language of the Due Process 
Clause and the decisions of the Supreme Court. 
The Due Process Clause forbids the government from depriving 
any person of life or liberty without due process of law.241 This 
language indicates that the protection applies to all persons inside the 
country, not only to citizens.242 Indeed, this is how the courts have 
interpreted the Fifth Amendment. In 1976, in Mathews v. Diaz,243 the 
Supreme Court stated that even unlawful aliens are entitled to Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendment protections.244 In 2001, in Zadvydas v. 
Davis,245 a landmark case that will be revisited below, the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed this principle, stating, “Once an alien enters the 
 
 234. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 942 (2010) (discussing “constitutionally 
protected interests” as “fundamental rights”). 
 235. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992) (“Freedom from physical restraint 
being a fundamental right, the State must have a particularly convincing reason, which it has not 
put forward, for such discrimination against insanity acquittees who are no longer mentally ill.”). 
 236. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987). 
 237. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80. 
 238. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356–57 (1997). 
 239. See Morris, supra note 233, at 279 (discussing the argument, advanced by some courts, 
that because excludable and deportable aliens have no right to be at large in the United States, 
they are not entitled to due process protection). 
 240. Id. 
 241. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 242. Id. 
 243. 426 U.S. 67 (1976). 
 244. Id. at 77–79; see Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 409 (6th Cir. 2003). 
 245. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
  
1512 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1477 
country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause 
applies to all persons within the United States, including aliens, 
whether their presence is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or 
permanent.”246 Finally, in 2003, in Demore v. Kim,247 the dissent once 
again echoed this point, insisting that “[i]t has been settled for over a 
century that all aliens within our territory are ‘persons’ entitled to the 
protection of the Due Process Clause.”248 
The courts have been more reluctant to recognize the due 
process rights of aliens who have not legally entered the country.249 
Such rights, when they come to fruition, tend to be limited.250 For 
example, in 2005, the Supreme Court, in Clark v. Martinez,251 
extended its holding in Zadvydas to benefit aliens who have not 
entered the country, but it also suggested that the same constitutional 
concerns were not necessarily at play due to the immigrant’s 
inadmissible status.252 Although inadmissible aliens may be entitled 
to less process, this does not mean that they receive no due process 
protections at all.253 A Sixth Circuit court pointed out, quite tellingly, 
that “[i]f excludable aliens were not protected by even the 
substantive component of constitutional due process . . . we do not 
see why the United States government could not torture or 
summarily execute them.”254 
 
 246. Id. at 679 (emphasis added). 
 247. 538 U.S. 510 (2003). 
 248. Id. at 543 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 249. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212–15 (1953); see also 
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682 (pointing out that aliens who have not yet gained initial admission, in 
contrast with those who have been admitted and are subsequently ordered removed, “present a 
very different question”). 
 250. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 78 (1976) (“The fact that all persons, aliens and citizens 
alike, are protected by the Due Process Clause does not lead to the further conclusion that all 
aliens are entitled to enjoy all the advantages of citizenship or, indeed, to the conclusion that all 
aliens must be placed in a single homogeneous legal classification.”); see also Shaughnessy, 345 
U.S. at 212 (stating that “an alien on the threshold of initial entry stands on a different footing” 
than an alien who has “passed through our gates”); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 
338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process 
as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.” (citing Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 
651, 659–60 (1892))). 
 251. 543 U.S. 371 (2005). 
 252. Id. at 380. 
 253. Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 410 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The fact that excludable 
aliens are entitled to less process . . . does not mean that they are not at all protected by the Due 
Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”). 
 254. Id. 
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Mandatory detention therefore cannot be justified on due 
process grounds. Even if one class of immigrants does not have full-
fledged due process rights, the Court has held that other immigrants 
do have significant due process rights. Yet mandatory detention 
treats all of these immigrants the same.255 
B.  Plenary Power Doctrine Does Not  
Legitimize the Current Immigration Detention System 
Others have defended the current immigration detention system 
by pointing to the plenary power doctrine.256 Proponents of this 
justification assert that the plenary power doctrine gives Congress 
great latitude to define the categories of admission, exclusion, and 
deportation.257 Under this view, “[i]f Congress believes that prior 
criminal convictions predict future dangerousness or flight risk” then 
Congress may, pursuant to its plenary power, “legislate that 
presumption.”258 There are two criticisms of this viewpoint. 
1.  Distinguishing Between the  
Power to Remove and the Power to Detain 
First, there is a fundamental difference between the 
government’s power to exclude and its power to detain.259 Although 
the plenary power doctrine gives Congress broad discretion over 
decisions pertaining to issues of admission and exclusion, it does not 
provide the government carte blanche to detain.260 Clearly, the 
authority to detain is a corollary of Congress’s removal power.261 
When detention is incidental to effectuating removal, Congress does 
not, however, have unbridled discretion to detain simply by virtue of 
 
 255. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 256. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603–07 (1889) (holding that the 
federal government has plenary power to regulate admission and exclusion of noncitizens 
pursuant to its sovereignty); see also Bhargava, supra note 185, at 63 (citing Chae Chan Ping, 
130 U.S. at 603–07) (noting how some defend the detention system on grounds that Congress has 
significant latitude pursuant to the plenary power doctrine). 
 257. Bhargava, supra note 185, at 63. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. (“[I]ssues of admission and exclusion are different from those of detention, and 
Congress’s plenary power over the former does not—and should not—presuppose a similar 
power over the latter.” (citing Cole, supra note 85, at 1038–39)). 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
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its broad power to remove, for the two powers are not coextensive.262 
That is, the former—detention—is not always necessary to achieve 
the latter—removal.263 
Moreover, conditions of detention, as indicated above, must 
comport with due process.264 The power to detain, therefore, is 
subject to constitutional constraints that do not bind the 
government’s power to remove. As such, detention falls within the 
government’s plenary power only when special circumstances 
require it, namely, when a removable person poses a risk of flight or 
danger.265 
2.  Limits on Congress’s Plenary Power over Immigration 
Second, plenary power is not boundless.266 The Supreme Court 
has placed important limitations on the doctrine.267 For instance, in 
Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme Court used statutory interpretation 
to draw a very clear and important line, effectively placing an 
expiration date on the government’s plenary power.268 Zadvydas, a 
resident alien, was ordered deported based on his criminal record, but 
the government failed to remove him during the ninety-day removal 
period because no country was willing to accept him.269 Zadvydas 
filed a habeas petition seeking release on grounds that the 
government could not detain him indefinitely.270 In 2001, in a 
landmark decision, the Supreme Court held that the post-removal 
order detention statute did not authorize indefinite detention but 
contained an implicit reasonableness time limitation.271 The Court set 
the permissible length of post-removal order detention at six months, 
at which point the immigrant must be released unless the government 
 
 262. Id. at 65–66. 
 263. See supra Part IV.A. 
 264. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (stating that Congress’s plenary power 
is subject to constitutional limitations). 
 265. See Bhargava, supra note 185, at 65. 
 266. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700–01. 
 267. Bhargava, supra note 185, at 63–64; see Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700–01. 
 268. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699 (interpreting “the statute to avoid a serious constitutional 
threat” and placing a six-month time limit on post-removal order detention). 
 269. Id. at 684–85. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. at 682 (“Based on our conclusion that indefinite detention . . . would raise serious 
constitutional concerns, we construe the statute to contain an implicit ‘reasonable time’ 
limitation . . . .”). 
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can show that there is a significant likelihood of removal in the 
reasonably foreseeable future.272 
The Zadvydas decision is significant because it places 
parameters on the government’s plenary power. The Court made it 
clear that the government’s interest in securing removal—an interest 
that is at the core of its plenary power—at some point must yield to 
the alien’s due process rights, even when the alien no longer has any 
claim to remain in the country.273 
While the Court in Zadvydas did not find a constitutional 
violation, it construed the federal statute so as to save it from 
constitutional attack.274 The Court reasoned, “A statute permitting 
indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional 
problem,” and so it chose to read a “reasonable time” limitation into 
the statute.275 Although the Court formally based its holding on 
statutory interpretation, the decision had the effect of placing a 
constitutional check on the government’s plenary power. 
In fact, the Supreme Court has been placing limits on plenary 
power for years.276 In 1952, the Court clearly stated that it would be 
unconstitutional to assume that every alien facing removal is 
dangerous.277 In Carlson v. Landon,278 four communist aliens were 
detained without bail pending a decision of their deportability.279 The 
Court upheld their detention on grounds that the Attorney General 
had sufficient reason to believe that releasing the communist aliens 
during the removal process could endanger the welfare or safety of 
the country.280 While it acknowledged that detention can be a 
necessary part of the removal process, the Court cautioned that 
“purpose to injure could not be imputed generally to all aliens 
subject to deportation.”281 Thus, the Court held that the statute, which 
gave the Attorney General discretion to detain, was constitutional 
 
 272. Id. at 701. 
 273. Id. at 689–90. 
 274. Id. (noting that, as a cardinal principle of statutory interpretation, the Court must first 
determine whether a fair construction of the statute can avoid the constitutional question). 
 275. Id. at 682, 690. 
 276. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538 (1952). 
 277. Id. 
 278. 342 U.S. 524 (1952). 
 279. Id. at 528–29. 
 280. Id. at 541–42. 
 281. Id. at 538. 
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precisely because it did not presume that all deportable aliens were 
dangerous.282 
Although more than fifty years ago the Court recognized that it 
would be impermissible to sweep all immigrants into detention based 
on generalized presumptions, this is what the government does 
today. Given that due process rights do apply to immigrants, and 
given that the government does not have unlimited plenary power, 
the procedural protections identified in Salerno and its progeny 
should apply in the context of immigration detention. In fact, recent 
case law casts even greater doubt on the plenary power and no-due-
process justifications for the current immigration detention system.283 
The Supreme Court and several lower courts have recently extended 
immigrants’ due process rights284 and have placed boundaries on the 
government’s plenary power.285 
C.  Trend Toward More Due Process  
Rights and Greater Limits on Plenary Power 
In the wake of Zadvydas, courts have imposed greater 
limitations on preventive detention as a tool in immigration removal 
proceedings.286 This trend creates an even stronger argument for 
rejecting the proposed justifications for the current system. The move 
toward greater due process rights and restrictions on plenary power is 
illustrated by the manner in which lower courts have faithfully 
 
 282. Id. at 541–42. 
 283. See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 371–72 (2005) (“[N]othing in Zadvydas 
indicates that § 1231(a)(6) authorizes detention until it approaches constitutional limits. Nor does 
§ 1182(d)(5) independently authorize continued detention of these aliens.”); Tuan Thai v. 
Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 790, 798 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We do not believe that Zadvydas can properly be 
read to prohibit the indefinite detention of dangerous resident aliens like Ma, while allowing the 
indefinite detention of dangerous resident aliens like Thai.”). 
 284. See, e.g., Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008) (“[D]ue process 
requires ‘adequate procedural protections’ to ensure that the government’s asserted justification 
for physical confinement ‘outweighs the individual’s constitutionally protected interest in 
avoiding physical restraint.’” (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690–91 (2001))). 
 285. See, e.g., Singh v. Mule, No. 07-CV-6387-CJS-VEB, 632009 WL 204618, at *5–7 
(W.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2009) (holding that DHS/ICE could not detain the petitioner, an Indian 
national and an alien, since DHS/ICE failed to demonstrate that it was significantly likely that the 
petitioner would be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future). 
 286. See, e.g., Tuan Thai, 366 F.3d at 792 (concluding that the Supreme Court’s statutory 
interpretation of section 1231(a)(6) does not allow “for the indefinite detention of an alien under 
special circumstances, such as the existence of a mental illness which makes the alien a danger to 
the community”). 
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followed Zadvydas287 and by the way that subsequent rulings have 
extended it.288 
1.  Lower Courts Faithfully Apply Zadvydas 
Several lower courts have followed Zadvydas and ordered the 
government to release detained immigrants, even in cases where 
detention is strongly in the government’s interest.289 For example, in 
Tuan Thai v. Ashcroft,290 the Ninth Circuit held that the six-month 
limit on post-removal order detention controlled, even though the 
alien posed a significant danger to the community.291 After entering 
the United States, Tuan Thai was convicted of assault, harassment, 
and third-degree rape.292 Nevertheless, the court held that the 
authorizing statute, as it was interpreted in Zadvydas, did not contain 
an exception for particularly dangerous individuals.293 The court 
pointed out that the state could use supervised parole or involuntary 
civil commitment as a way to abate the risk that Thai posed to the 
public.294 
In 2008, in Tran v. Mukasey,295 the Fifth Circuit also applied the 
Zadvydas six-month rule despite the government’s contention that 
there should be an exception for violent, mentally-ill detainees.296 Ha 
Tran, like Tuan Thai, had a well-documented history of violence and 
mental illness.297 He spent two years in a mental hospital, followed 
by six months in a halfway house, and then murdered his wife the 
day after he was released.298 Nevertheless, the court held that the 
government did not have the authority to detain Tran beyond the six-
 
 287. See id. 
 288. See, e.g., Clark, 543 U.S. at 378–79, 386 (applying a strict interpretation of the Zadvydas 
test). 
 289. See, e.g., Tran v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 478, 479 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that continued 
detention of an alien beyond the ninety-day removal period was unacceptable despite the alien’s 
mental illness); Tuan Thai, 366 F.3d at 792 (holding that an alien should not be detained even 
though he may possess ill mental health and a criminal history). 
 290. 366 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 291. Tuan Thai, 366 F.3d at 792. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. at 797–98. 
 294. Id. at 799. 
 295. 515 F.3d 478 (5th Cir. 2008). 
 296. Id. 482–83. 
 297. Id. at 480. 
 298. Id. 
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month mark, given that removal was unlikely in the near future.299 
Agreeing with the Ninth Circuit, the court reasoned that it is of no 
consequence whether a detained immigrant poses a risk to the public, 
even a grave risk, because such a finding does not change the 
constitutional analysis.300 The six-month rule from Zadvydas does not 
include an exception for dangerousness.301 
These cases illustrate the decisive boundary that the Supreme 
Court drew in Zadvydas. The government has an obvious interest in 
protecting the public from repeat violent offenders, rapists, and 
murderers, especially when offenders have documented mental 
illnesses that increase the risk of future dangerousness. However, 
even when the government has a compelling reason to keep an 
immigrant detained, detention must still be reasonable.302 That is to 
say, if removal is not reasonably foreseeable at the six-month mark, 
then the immigrant’s interest in liberty trumps the government’s 
interest in continuing to detain the immigrant, regardless of how 
compelling this interest may be.303 
Courts have also interpreted and applied Zadvydas in a way that 
has created an onerous burden for the state.304 Lower courts, for 
instance, have required the state to show the likelihood of 
effectuating removal as to the specific immigrant.305 In Singh v. 
Mule,306 a citizen of India conceded his removal, but the government 
could not remove him because the Indian Consulate failed to respond 
to requests for travel documents.307 The court rejected the 
government’s contention that it was still making a “good faith effort” 
to remove Singh, and it also dismissed the government’s statistics-
based argument that DHS had repatriated many hundreds of aliens to 
India in recent years.308 According to the court, what mattered was 
 
 299. Id. at 484–85. 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id. at 485. 
 302. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (stating that Congress must implement 
its power to detain in a constitutionally permissible manner). 
 303. See Singh v. Mule, No. 07-CV-6387-CJS-VEB, 2009 WL 204618, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. 
Jan. 27, 2009). 
 304. See, e.g., id. 
 305. Id. at *4–5. 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. at *2–4. 
 308. Id. at *4–5. 
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not a showing of a good faith effort or evidence that the government 
could hypothetically remove immigrants to India.309 Instead, the 
government needed to show that it was reasonably likely to remove 
Singh, himself, in the near future.310 Given the Indian Consulate’s 
protracted silence, the court held that Singh was entitled to release.311 
Singh is significant because it narrows the scope of cases in 
which detention beyond the six-month mark will be authorized by 
increasing the government’s burden of proof.312 In order to justify 
ongoing detention, the government cannot simply point to a 
repatriation agreement with the immigrant’s native country or 
suggest the accessibility of travel documents.313 Rather, the 
government must show a real, concrete likelihood of removing the 
specific immigrant in the reasonably foreseeable future.314 
2.  Extending Zadvydas and Moving  
Toward Greater Due Process Protection 
In 2005, the Supreme Court answered the question left open by 
its decision in Zadvydas when it held that the six-month presumptive 
limit on post-removal order detention applied not only to removable 
immigrants but to inadmissible immigrants as well.315 In Clark v. 
Martinez,316 the Supreme Court held that even inadmissible 
immigrants who have not legally entered the country are protected 
from indefinite detention.317 The Court insisted that the holding must 
apply to all categories of aliens because it would not make sense to 
interpret the statute to contain a reasonableness time limit as to one 
class, but not the other.318 Although the Court avoided the question of 
whether inadmissible immigrants are entitled to the same due process 
 
 309. Id. at *5 (“[R]espondents’ past successes in removing aliens to India did not amount to a 
significant likelihood of removal of Singh in the reasonably foreseeable future.”). 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. at *7. The case was eventually dismissed as moot as Singh was deported to India. Id. 
at *7–8. 
 312. See id. at *4–5. 
 313. Id. at *5. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378–79, 386 (2005). 
 316. 543 U.S. 371 (2005). 
 317. Id. at 378–79. 
 318. Id. 
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rights that removable immigrants are,319 the Court’s decision signaled 
an important break with past traditions.320 Historically, the 
government, relying on the legal fiction of nonentrance, has given 
the least number of rights and protections to immigrants found at the 
border.321 Thus, Martinez represents a significant step toward greater 
due process rights for all immigrants because the Supreme Court 
declined to use nonentry as a reason to siphon away the due process 
protections that are afforded to other classes of immigrants. 
In addition, in Prieto-Romero v. Clark,322 the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit extended the Zadvydas six-month limit 
on post-removal order detention to another immigration statute.323 
Prieto-Romero concerned section 1226(a), a statute authorizing 
discretionary detention pending removal,324 whereas Zadvydas 
required the Court to interpret section 1231(a)(6),325 a statute 
authorizing mandatory detention for inadmissible or criminal aliens. 
Nevertheless, the court applied the six-month rule from Zadvydas, 
reasoning that it would be “incongruous” to conclude “that Congress 
intended other detention statutes to authorize the indefinite detention 
of aliens, where such detention would clearly pose . . . constitutional 
concerns.”326 
The Ninth Circuit has even applied the principle in Zadvydas to 
pre-removal order detention.327 In Tijani v. Willis,328 the Ninth Circuit 
held that an alien who was detained for two years and eight months 
while awaiting a removal decision was entitled to release on bail 
unless the government could establish that he posed a risk of flight or 
a danger to his community.329 The court did not address the 
 
 319. Id. at 381–82. 
 320. For an illustration of how courts have previously restricted the due process rights of 
immigrants stopped at the border, see Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 
212, 214–16 (1953). See also supra note 250 (listing cases that discuss limitations on due process 
rights of aliens who have not legally entered the country). 
 321. See supra note 250. 
 322. 534 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 323. Id. at 1062–63. 
 324. Id. at 1057. 
 325. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001). 
 326. Prieto-Romero, 534 F.3d at 1063. 
 327. See Tijani v. Willis, 430 F.3d 1241, 1242 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 328. 430 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 329. Id. at 1242. 
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constitutional issues that prolonged pre-removal order detention 
raised, however, because it held that the statute called for “expedited 
removal,” and two years and eight months was clearly not 
expeditious.330 Nevertheless, the court challenged the scope of the 
plenary power doctrine, stating that “[d]espite the substantial powers 
that Congress may exercise in regard to aliens, it is constitutionally 
doubtful that Congress may authorize imprisonment of this duration 
for lawfully admitted resident aliens who are subject to removal.”331 
In Nadarajah v. Gonzales,332 the Ninth Circuit again chose to 
impose Zadvydas-type time limitations on pre-removal order 
detention.333 In Nadarajah, an asylum-seeker who was repeatedly 
tortured in Sri Lanka was detained for nearly five years, despite 
having prevailed at every level of administrative review.334 The court 
insisted that this amounted to indefinite detention and rejected the 
government’s argument that his detention was finite because 
“someday” the Attorney General would review his case and his 
detention would thereby come to an end.335 The court held that the 
government is without authority, under the current detention statutes, 
to detain an alien indefinitely,336 and because removal was not 
reasonably foreseeable, the court called for the alien’s release.337 
There is no principled justification for the immigration detention 
system. The common justifications fail because immigrants do have 
due process rights and the government’s plenary power to detain 
them is not boundless. Moreover, several lower courts have 
demonstrated a willingness to recognize even greater due process 
rights and to impose more limits on the government’s plenary power, 
suggesting that the time is ripe to reevaluate the immigration 
detention system. 
 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. 
 332. 443 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 333. Id. at 1076–78. 
 334. Id. at 1071. 
 335. Id. at 1081. 
 336. Id. at 1079. 
 337. Id. at 1082. 
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VI.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although Zadvydas established some protections for post-
removal order detainees, the entire immigration detention system 
requires comprehensive reform. The government needs to implement 
procedures that are geared toward protecting pre-removal order 
detainees from unconstitutional deprivations. 
Pre-removal order detainees should be given more, not less, 
protection than post-removal order detainees receive because pre-
removal order detainees may have legitimate claims to remain in the 
United States.338 Post-removal order detainees’ claims have been 
foreclosed, and yet they are protected from prolonged detention.339 
Pre-removal order detainees, on the other hand, may have valid 
claims for political asylum, their criminal offenses may not warrant 
expedited removal, and they may be lawful permanent residents or 
even citizens. And yet, pre-removal order detainees are not protected 
from prolonged detention.340 Moreover, these individuals arguably 
have more to lose because detention can interfere with their ability to 
challenge their removal.341 Detention makes it more difficult for 
immigrants to obtain counsel,342 it severely hinders an immigrant’s 
ability to conduct legal research,343 and it interferes with an 
immigrant’s access to medical and psychological services344—
services that may be critical to a successful claim.345 It is illogical that 
pre-removal order detainees have fewer rights and receive fewer 
protections than their post-removal order counterparts enjoy. 
The traditional preventive detention safeguards should be 
applied to immigration detention. At the very least, there should be 
individualized hearings and strictly enforced time limits on pre-
removal order detention. Furthermore, in order for this to become a 
constitutionally sound system, the conditions of confinement must 
 
 338. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 560–61 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that 
from a constitutional standpoint, pre-removal order detainees actually have a stronger claim 
against confinement than post-removal order detainees do). 
 339. See id. 
 340. See supra Parts III, IV.B. 
 341. Demore, 538 U.S. at 554 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 342. See Brané & Lundholm, supra note 25, at 159 (citing COLE, supra note 125, at 35) 
(“Statistics indicate that as many as 80% of immigration detainees are not represented . . . .”). 
 343. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 344. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 345. See supra Part III.A.3. 
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drastically improve so as to reflect the regulatory purpose of 
immigration detention. 
A.  Noncitizens Should Receive  
Individualized Hearings Before They Are Detained 
An immigrant facing detention should receive an adversarial 
hearing where an impartial party determines whether the immigrant 
poses a risk of flight or a danger to his or her community. That is, 
before the government drastically infringes on an immigrant’s liberty 
rights, the government should have to show that detaining the 
immigrant is in the government’s interest. 
Currently, mandatory detention statutes permit the government 
to presume that all immigrants who are subject to removal 
proceedings are either dangerous or likely to abscond, despite the 
fact that the offenses that trigger mandatory detention do not 
necessarily suggest either a propensity for violence or a risk of 
flight.346 Adversarial hearings are therefore needed in order to probe 
that presumption. If the immigrant poses neither a risk of flight nor a 
danger to his or her community, then detention should not be 
authorized. 
Using Salerno as a guide, DHS should be required to 
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the immigrant is 
either likely to abscond or poses a danger to the community.347 The 
immigrant should be given the opportunity to testify, present 
witnesses, proffer evidence, and cross-examine other witnesses. 
Asylum-seekers who have passed their credible-fear interview 
and do not pose a danger to the public should be automatically 
paroled and referred to shelters and pro bono legal clinics, where 
they can receive the physical, psychological, and legal assistance that 
they require. 
B.  Pre-Removal Order Detention  
Should Be Subject to Strict Time Limits 
Furthermore, there should be time constraints placed on pre-
removal order detention because the Court has time and again held 
 
 346. See supra Part IV.A. 
 347. The act in Salerno used “clear and convincing” as the burden of proof. United States v. 
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987). Proof by a preponderance of the evidence would likely suffice 
in the immigration context. 
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that prolonged detention is unconstitutional.348 In Zadvydas, for 
example, the Court indicated that prolonged detention is 
unconstitutional, but it found that pre-removal order detention, unlike 
post-removal order detention, is not prolonged because it has an 
“obvious termination point.”349 The Court drew a similar conclusion 
in Demore when it upheld the constitutionality of pre-removal order 
detention without individualized hearings on grounds that pre-
removal order detention is “brief.”350 Had the Court appreciated the 
true nature of pre-removal order detention in each case, it would 
have reached the opposite conclusion. Limits on pre-removal order 
detention, therefore, will fit squarely within the thrust of the 
Zadvydas holding, just as soon as the Court acknowledges that pre-
removal order detention is anything but brief. 
Some immigrants wait in pre-removal order detention for 
months or even years.351 In order to address this problem, the 
government should impose deadlines on pre-removal order detention, 
just as it has done in the post-removal order context.352 
Moreover, to remedy the lag that currently exists between the 
time when a detainee is taken into custody and when he or she 
receives charging papers,353 DHS should require ICE to promptly 
provide detainees with charging documents within twenty-four hours 
of being taken into custody. Charging papers inform detainees of the 
charges against them and formally place them in removal 
proceedings.354 Unbelievably, it can take months for a detainee to 
receive these papers.355 Not only do such delays prolong the already 
protracted removal process, but they can also prevent detainees from 
accessing an immigration court for a bond hearing or petition for 
habeas relief until DHS has served charging documents with the 
immigration court. 
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DHS should also establish a reasonable time frame for removal 
proceedings. This article proposes that detainees receive a hearing on 
the merits before an immigration judge within ninety days of 
receiving charging documents. 
Those who resist this model suggest that immigrants will simply 
pursue “dilatory tactics” in order to run out the clock and gain 
release.356 However, to alleviate this worry, the clock could simply 
temporarily stop running whenever an immigrant requests a 
continuance or otherwise stalls the proceedings.357 
C.  The Current Detention System Should Be  
Overhauled so as to Improve the Conditions of Confinement 
Detention will sometimes be in the government’s best interest. 
Once it is determined that an immigrant is a flight risk or poses a 
danger to his or her community, then that individual should enter a 
detention system. However, the nature of the detention must reflect 
the regulatory purpose of civil detention. 
1.  Immigration Detention Must Become More Civil 
First of all, the government should reform the detention system 
so as to create an intelligible distinction between civil custody and 
penal incarceration. If immigration detainees are still to be held in 
jail facilities, then they should be segregated from the criminal 
population at all times. Also, staff at these facilities should be trained 
to understand the differences between criminal inmates and civil 
detainees, and they should be familiarized with the divergent 
regulations that govern the treatment of each population, 
respectively. Moreover, immigrants in detention should enjoy greater 
freedom; they should be entitled to more lenient visitation privileges 
and more opportunities for recreation. Immigrants in detention 
should not be subjected to physical restraints unless restraints are 
necessary to protect the immigrant or any other person from 
immediate harm. They should also have the option of no-contact 
visits in order to avoid invasive strip searches.358 
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On the whole, immigration detention should look more like civil 
custody and less like jail. 
2.  Immigration Detention Facilities  
Should Be Subject to Binding Regulation 
Additionally, because there is currently no legitimate regulatory 
oversight, the government should establish standards for detention 
facilities and codify these regulations into the law. Without 
enforceable rules, there is no way to hold facilities accountable when 
they fail to maintain suitable detention conditions. And, as indicated 
above, detention facilities have come under great scrutiny for failing 
to meet even the most basic detainee needs, such as adequate food, 
water, and medical care. 
Binding regulation is even more important if detention remains 
privatized. As discussed above, for-profit private facilities have 
strong financial incentive to cut corners, which leads to substandard 
detention conditions. Thus, in order to counteract this incentive, 
legitimate consequences should be imposed on facilities that fail to 
comply with the minimum detention standards. The facilities should 
face monetary sanctions for minor violations and should lose their 
contracts and be shut down entirely for major or repeated incidents 
of noncompliance. Moreover, detainees must be able to initiate 
litigation if a facility or its management fails to comply with the 
regulations. Finally, as an additional check on the system, the 
government should adopt policies in order to promote increased 
transparency with respect to facility audits. 
3.  The Government Should  
Embrace Alternatives to Detention 
The government should also utilize alternatives to detention for 
nondangerous immigrants who pose only a low or moderate risk of 
flight. ICE currently has three alternative programs in place, but none 
are available to noncitizens who are subject to mandatory 
detention.359 Some advocates have suggested that conceptualizing the 
alternatives as “soft” detention or “constructive custody” could make 
them available to mandatory detainees.360 If mandatory detainees 
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could enter these alternative forms of custody, “the potential savings 
to the government and benefits to the individuals would be 
immense.”361 
The three alternative programs incorporate varying degrees of 
supervision and self-reporting. The programs include different 
combinations of electronic monitoring, curfews, in-person reporting, 
and unannounced home visits. According to ICE, it costs anywhere 
from thirty cents to fifteen dollars a day to supervise an immigrant 
under one of these programs.362 In contrast, it costs $141 a day to 
hold an immigrant in detention.363 Not only are these alternatives less 
expensive, but they also appear to work. ICE has reported that for 
each of its three models, 87 percent, 96 percent, and 93 percent of 
immigrants appear for their removal hearings, respectively. 
DHS should consider rigorous in-home detention as an 
alternative to custodial detention, especially for mandatory detainees 
whose criminal records do not indicate violent tendencies.364 
Alternative models, moreover, are in many instances more 
appropriate, especially with respect to asylum-seekers and torture 
survivors. Once asylum-seekers demonstrate that they have a 
credible fear, and unless they pose a danger to the community, they 
should be paroled and recommended to shelters where they can 
receive the necessary physical, emotional, and legal support that they 
require. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
“[D]ue Process requires that the nature and duration of 
commitment bear some reasonable relation to purpose for which the 
individual is committed.”365 Yet, Vinodbhai Patel was detained for 
nearly a year despite the fact that his confinement furthered no 
governmental purpose. Patel was a nonviolent entrepreneur with 
strong social and family ties. He was neither a danger nor a flight 
risk. Patel’s confinement, both in nature and duration, was 
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unreasonable. Had he received the same procedural protections that 
inhere in all other preventive detention contexts, the 
unconstitutionality of his detention would have been apparent. 
The United States places hundreds of thousands of immigrants 
in detention every year, at unspeakable costs to the nation as well as 
to the individuals who must struggle to navigate the broken system. 
Many of the immigrants who are currently clogging the detention 
system are like Vinodbhai Patel—they pose neither a risk of flight, 
nor a danger to their community—and yet they are stripped of their 
fundamental rights and tossed into an already congested system. 
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court acknowledged that noncitizens, 
even those who are unlawfully present, have a powerful interest in 
avoiding physical confinement, and so the Court placed a deadline 
on post-removal order detention. Several lower courts have 
recognized that pre-removal order detainees have at least an equal 
interest, if not a greater one, in avoiding unnecessary confinement, 
and the courts have thereby called for greater procedural protections. 
As the dissent in Demore pointed out, “[t]hese cases yield a simple 
distillate”: it is unconstitutional to mandatorily detain large groups of 
immigrants without affording them any procedural safeguards.366 
“Due process calls for an individual determination before someone is 
locked away.”367 
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